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Investigation and Conciliation of
Employment Discrimination Charges
Under Title VII: Employers'
Rights in an Adversary Process
By LAWRENCE ALLEN KATZ*
Introduction
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' a legislative enactment
designed to prohibit discrimination in employment on the grounds of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, was the product of many
compromises.2 One particularly significant compromise which facilitat-
ed passage of the act was the agreement to minimize the enforcement
powers of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
the agency responsible for the administration of Title VII. The original
act authorized the EEOC to seek compliance with the statute by nudg-
ing adverse parties into voluntary settlements.3 By 1971, the enforce-
ment machinery of the act had "proven to be seriously defective in
providing an effective Federal remedy for violations of Title VII,' 4 and
* B.A., 1964, Harvard University; J.D., 1967, Boston College Law School;
member, Streich, Lang, Weeks, Cardon & French, Phoenix, Arizona; member of the New
York and Arizona Bars. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Barry Silverman
of the Arizona Bar for his valuable research assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1970 & Supp. V, 1975).
2. See generally Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. In. & COM. L. REv.
431 (1966).
3. See id. at 450-52; Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. Rv. 1109, 1195-97, 1228-41
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Developments]; Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employ-
ment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 U. Cm. L. REV. 430, 432 (1965); 1975
UTAH. L. REV. 264, 271.
4. S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1971). Although private parties
could file suit on their own behalf, few complainants had the means to undertake such a
task. As a result, lawsuits were instituted in fewer than 10% of the cases in which the
EEOC had failed to achieve conciliation. Hearings on S. 2453 Before the Subcomm. on
Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 40
(1969) (statement of William H. Brown MIT, Chairman, EEOC).
[877]
stronger provisions granting more power to the EEOC were recom-
mended. 5 As a result of further compromises in Congress, the first
substantial amendments to Title VII were enacted in March 1972.6
The 1972 amendments did not authorize the EEOC to hold hear-
ings or to issue cease and desist orders as many had advocated.7  On the
other hand, they did grant to the commission authority to institute
lawsuits on behalf of aggrieved persons and to obtain appropriate relief.8
The active exercise of this power' has made the EEOC a formidable
antidiscrimination force. 10 Because the cost of litigating against the
commission is so high and the potential liability is so great," the
5. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 3, at 1269-75; Title VII, Civil Rights Act
of 1964: Present Operation and Proposals for Improvement, 5 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB.
1, 51-60 (1969). See generally H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971).
6. Act of March 24, 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42
U.S.C. 8H 2000e to e-17 (Supp. V, 1975)).
7. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1971); H.R. REP. No. 238,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 8-11 (1971); Developments, supra note 3, at 1271-72; Title VII,
Civil Rights Act of 1964: Present Operation and Proposals for Improvement, 5 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 1, 52-54 (1969). Many still advocate giving cease and desist powers
to the EEOC. In 1975, for example, the annual report of the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission recommended creation of a National Employment Rights Board vested with
authority to issue cease and desist orders reviewable in the federal appellate courts. 2
CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE M 5340, at 3663 (1975).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f) to (g) (Supp. V, 1975).
9. The EEOC has established regional litigation centers in Philadelphia, Atlanta,
Chicago, Denver and San Francisco. 8 EEOC ANN. REP. 19 (1973). in the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1973, the commission filed 116 lawsuits. Id. In fiscal 1974, it filed 145
suits; in fiscal 1975, 318 suits; and in the first nine months of fiscal 1976, 307 suits.
BNA EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, Summary of Recent Developments, No. 7, at 1
(1976). In its second year under the new amendments, the EEOC's General Counsel
authorized staff increased from 422 to 538, a growth rate of nearly 30%. Compare 8
EEOC ANN. REP. 30 (1973), with 9 EEOC ANN. REP. 29 (1974).
10. The EEOC is not the only such force faced by the employer. He may also
have to contend with rigorous investigations by other agencies of the federal and state
government and, if his employees are represented by a union, with arbitration in which
the grievant alleges breach of the discrimination clause of the labor contract. Neither the
EEOC nor the complainant is bound by the results of these proceedings. The employer,
on the other hand, faces exposure to substantial financial liability in each forum. See
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974); United States v. Sweet Home
Cent. School Dist., 407 F. Supp. 1362, 1366 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) (under Title VII
"[r]epetitive investigations are envisioned"). The U.S. Civil Rights Commission has
recommended creation of a single federal agency to hear and determine all discrimina-
tion complaints except those involving only individual charges, which would be referred
to approved state and local agencies. 2 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 5340, at 3664
(1975).
11. Back pay liability may accrue for as long as two years prior to the filing of the
charge with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V, 1975). The average time
for the EEOC to process charges has been as long as twenty-six months. See 9 EEOC
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employer is extremely vulnerable to EEOC settlement pressure during
the processing of a charge under Title VII. 12
The commission's capacity to institute lawsuits has undoubtedly
increased its credibility with employers and has substantially augmented
its ability to investigate and conciliate charges of discrimination. More-
over, the courts have shown a pronounced tendency to construe the
statute as vesting broad investigative powers in the commission. 13  Ac-
cordingly, the employer must deal with EEOC representatives in a
manner which is both cooperative and defensive. The role of the
EEOC investigator is theoretically a neutral one; in reality, however, the
adversary process begins with the filing of the charge. The employer
who fails to recognize this fact will eventually learn that, procedurally,
he has been burning bridges behind him.
ANN. REP. 8 (1974). A lawsuit might not be filed for several months thereafter. Thus,
back pay liability can easily accumulate for four to six years before a judgment is
finally entered in a court action. This period of time can be increased if the EEOC
delays filing suit, since Title VII does not contain a statute of limitations applicable to
the EEOC. See EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 533, 536 n.5 (9th Cir.
1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3101 (U.S. July 23, 1976) (No. 76-99). A
small minority of courts have dismissed, on the ground of laches; EEOC suits instituted
an unreasonably long time after the charge was filed. See, e.g., EEOC v. Moore Group,
Inc., 11 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 10,886 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 1976) (five year delay);
EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 11 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 10,661 (N.D. Ala. 1975) (four
year delay); cf. EEOC v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 11 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. If
10,932 (D.S.C. 1976) (four year delay in issuing investigative subpoena warrants denial
of enforcement). Other courts have barred back pay claims because of the EEOC's
delay in filing suit. E.g., EEOC v. American Mach. & Foundry, Inc., 12 CCH EMPL.
PRAC. DEC. 11,200 at 5524-25 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1976).
12. The EEOC has achieved some staggering settlements since the 1972 amend-
ments were enacted. In its first year under the amendments, the commission negotiated
an agreement with the American Telephone and Telegraph Company which included a
$15 million payment to minority personnel. 8 EEOC ANN. REP. 27 (1973). In its
second year under the amendments, the EEOC obta'ned a $31 million settlement from
nine steel companies and the United Steelworkers of-America, and an additional $30
million settlement from AT&T. 9 EEOC ANN. REP. 7 (1974). In August 1976, the
commission announced settlement of charges against Gulf Oil Company, including a
payment of $935,000 to 640 employees. CCH LAB. L. REP. No. 114, at 4 (Aug. 5,
1976). The EEOC's new enforcement powers obviously provide greater incentive for
employers to conciliate discrimination charges. "In the first quarter of FY 1973 the
Commission was successful in approximately 25 percent of its attempted conciliations; by
the second quarter of FY 1974, the success rate had climbed to nearly 50 percent." 9
EEOC ANN. REP. 1 (1974). Indeed, the EEOC has been criticized for utilizing "legal
blackmail" to obtain unreasonable settlements. Bleiberg, Liberty or License? EEOC
Evidently Opts for the Latter, Barron's, May 31, 1976, at 7, col. 4.
13. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970);
EEOC v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 11 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,935 (D.
Md. May 4, 1976).
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This article will analyze and evaluate the employer's legal position
and his procedural rights in an EEOC investigation of discrimination
charges and in the commission's conciliation efforts. To a great extent
the employer's rights are a function of the limitations imposed upon the
EEOC by the statute and by the agency's own regulations. 4 It is in the
employer's interest to be aware of these restrictions on the commission's
power and to assert his rights when appropriate.' 5 By so doing, the
employer will increase his chances for a favorable resolution of the
charge and may avoid an unnecessarily costly settlement.
The Charge
The first step an employer should take when an EEOC investiga-
tion begins is to determine whether the commission has jurisdiction of
the charge. The threshold inquiry is whether there is an appropriate
charging party. The EEOC's jurisdiction is properly invoked only
when a charge of discrimination is filed by an "aggrieved" individual, by
someone acting on his behalf, or by one of the commissioners.' 6 The
objections of one who is merely a "concerned citizen" are insufficient.' 7
It is not necessary, however, that the aggrieved person be an employee
of the respondent-employer' or that he have applied for a job with
14. Fulfillment of various procedural requirements is a condition precedent to an
EEOC lawsuit. EEOC v. Hickey-Mitchell Co., 507 F.2d 944, 947-48 (8th Cir. 1974).
15. See, e.g., EEOC v. Air Guide Corp., 539 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1976) (failure to
issue timely notice of charge); EEOC v. Hickey-Mitchell Co., 507 F.d 944 (8th Cir.
1974) (failure to notify employer of opportunity to reopen conciliation discussions);
Veazie v. Southern Greyhound Lines, 374 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. La. 1974) (failure to
notify employer that reasonable cause determination was being reconsidered). In most
cases, the employer's assertion of procedural rights under Title VII will be made when he
opposes an EEOC subpoena or lawsuit, but in some circumstances (e.g., lengthy EEOC
delays) the employer may wish to institute legal action himself. The employer cannot
sue the EEOC under Title VII because he is not a person "aggrieved" by an unlawful
employment practice within the meaning of the act. However, the employer may be able
to maintain a suit against the EEOC for violation of its regulations under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970), or under the mandamus statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1361 (1970). See Steward v. EEOC, 12 CCH EMPL. PRAC. DEC. 11,152
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 1976); Pima County Comm. College Dist. v. EEOC, 11 CCH Empl.
Prac. Dec. 10,867 (D. Ariz. Apr. 7, 1976). The respondent might also be able to re-
cover attorney's fees when the EEOC institutes a procedurally defective suit. Van
Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131, 1132 (9th Cir. 1974); EEOC v. Western
Elec. Co., 10 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,370 (D. Md. 1975).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), (d) (Supp. V, 1975); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.6, .10
(1975).
17. EEOC Dec. No. 75-006, 2 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GumE 6460 (1974); EEOC
Dec. No. 74-80, 2 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 6421 (1974).
18. Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1973). An
independent contractor, however, cannot raise Title VII claims against the person for
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the respondent.19 It is enough that the charging party demonstrate a
real, present interest in a job and the existence of an unlawful deterrent
to employment.20
An individual has standing to maintain a charge only if he was
personally aggrieved by a discriminatory employment practice. Thus, a
Caucasian would lack standing to allege discrimination against Blacks,21
and a Black could not complain of discrimination against Hispanics.22
However, a minority employee may have standing to challenge his
employer's discriminatory treatment of other members of the employee's
racial or ethnic group on the ground that his own opportunities and
psychological well-being are adversely affected by such treatment.23
Similarly, a Caucasian might be able to establish standing to contest an
employer's unlawful discrimination against minorities because it has a
detrimental impact on his psychological well-being by creating an un-
pleasant work environment.24
The EEOC regulations specify the content of the charge, including
a requirement that it be made under oath,25 but these rules are generally
whom he provides services. Mathis v. Standard Brands Chem. Indus., 10 CCH Empl.
Prac. Dec. 10,306 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
19. Hailes v. United Airlines, 464 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1972).
20. Id. the employment from which the complainant was deterred can be with
someone other than the respondent-employer. See, e.g., Sibley Memorial Hosp. v.
Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comm'n,
375 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1974).
21. EEOC v. Quick Shop Mkts., Inc., 396 F. Supp. 133, 135 (E.D. Mo. 1975),
aff'd, 10 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. I 10,519 (8th Cir. 1975).
22. EEOC v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 11 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec.
10,935, at 7961-62 (D. Md. May 4, 1976), afl'd, 12 CCH EMPL. PRAC. DEC. 11,017
(4th Cir. June 29, 1976).
23. Gray v. Greyhound Lines, 12 CCH EMPL. PRAc. DEC. 11,211, at 5580 (D.C.
Cir. Oct. 13, 1976); see Gamble v. Birmingham S.R.R., 514 F.2d 678, 687-88 (5th Cir.
1975); Circle K Corp. v. EEOC, 501 F.2d 1052, 1054 (10th Cir. 1974); Graniteville Co.
v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32, 35-37 (4th Cir. 1971). A complainant's standing to maintain a
lawsuit challenging employment practices which have not directly injured him is less
certain than his ability to instigate an EEOC investigation of such practices. See Doctor
v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 12 CCH EMPL. PRAC DEC. 11,037, at 4832 (4th Cir.
1976) (plaintiff who did not transfer to another department cannot complain of
transferees' discriminatory loss of seniority); Causey v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 416,
421 (5th Cir. 1975) (new hire cannot challenge recruitment program).
24. See, e.g., Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 12 CCH EMPL. PRAc. DEc. 11,238 (9th
Cir. Nov. 12, 1976); cf. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 957 (1972) (employee may challenge employer's treatment of customers);
See also Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (White tenant of
apartment has standing to challenge landlord's discrimination against Black applicants
for housing).
25. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.8, .11 (1975).
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considered to be administrative conveniences and technicalities. As
such, they may be waived by the EEOC or cured by subsequent amend-
ments.26 The judiciary has taken the view that, because of the paternal-
istic nature of the statute, an individual's failure to comply with techni-
cal requirements in the original charge does not warrant dismissal of a
subsequent lawsuit.17
The commission has jurisdiction only over charges which are time-
ly filed. To be timely, a charge must be filed within 180 days of the
unlawful employment practice, except in those cases where the individu-
al has filed the charge with the appropriate state or local agency. 28  In
such a case, the charging party obtains the benefit of an extended time
limit under Title VII and may file with the EEOC within three hundred
days of the unlawful practice or within thirty days after receiving notice
that the state or local agency has terminated proceedings in the matter,
whichever is earlier.29 If the complainant fails to file a timely state
26. Id. § 1601.11(b). "A generalized plea for assistance addressed to the commis-
sion is enough to justify the intake of a charge." CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL §
2.1(c) (1976); see Russell v. American Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d 357, 364 (4th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1666 (1976) (unsworn charge does not warrant later
dismissal of suit); Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., 464 F.2d 723, 724-25 (6th
Cir. 1972) (untimely charge is made timely by relation back to earlier unsworn charge);
Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1969) (letter is adequate
charge); Mack v. General Elec. Co., 329 F. Supp. 72, 77 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (copy of
petition to President of United States protesting company's policies is valid charge); cf.
Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1972) (open letter to public is not
valid charge); EEOC v. Appalachian Power Co., 13 CCH EMPL. PRAc. DEC. 11,293
(W.D. Va. Sept. 10, 1976) (suit dismissed for commissioner's failure to swear to
charge). "Anonymous charges are not to be processed." CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL § 2.4 (1976); see Jones v. Holy Cross Hosp., 64 F.R.D. 586, 589 (D. Md.
1974). The commission's stated policy is to close any file where the charging party
cannot be located during the investigation. CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8.5(c)
(1976). One of the commissioners could, of course, file his own charge based on
information received from anonymous sources. See EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co.,
535 F.2d 533, 542 (9th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3101 (U.S. July
23, 1976) (No. 76-99); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.5 (1975).
27. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. V, 1975).
29. Id. If the charge is filed with the EEOC first, the commission must defer the
charge to the state or local agency with appropriate jurisdiction for sixty days. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. V, 1975); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (1975). Even charges filed
by one of the commissioners must be deferred to the state agency before the EEOC can
assert jurisdiction. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.10 (1975); Motorola, Inc. v. EEOC, 460 F.2d 1245
(9th Cir. 1972). An oral referral to the state agency by the EEOC will satisfy this
requirement. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 525 (1972); cf. Faraci v. Hickey-
Freeman Co., 404 F. Supp. 1229 (W.D.N.Y. 1975) (letter to state agency satisfies
requirement even if agency does not accept letter as complaint). If the state does not
prohibit the particular employment practice which is the subject of the charge, or does
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charge, he should not be entitled to the extended EEOC filing period,
since he has defeated, not satisfied, the congressional intent that local
authorities have the first opportunity to resolve claims of discrimina-
tion.30
There has been considerable judicial confusion regarding the rela-
tionship between the state and federal statutes of limitation and the
extent of the complainant's obligation to seek relief from the state
agency before turning to the EEOC. The statute clearly contemplates
prior resort to the state remedy 1 but offers little guidance with respe6t
to conflicts in timing. The courts, however, have consistently construed
the act in favor of the complainant. Thus, although Title VII appears to
require that all charges of discrimination be filed somewhere within 180
days, it has been held that the charging party need not file his complaint
within 180 days if the state allows more time and the charge is filed with
the state within the state limitations period.32 Where the state statute of
limitations is less than 180 days, a timely Title VII charge will not be
barred on the grounds that it was not timely filed with the state
agency.33  Furthermore, it has been held that the EEOC's failure to
not afford an adequate remedy, deferral is unnecessary. EEOC v. United States Fidelity
& Guar Co., 10 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. I 10,549 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 12 CCH EMPL.
PRAc. DEC. 1111,017 (4th Cir. June 29, 1976); Hankeson v. Ohio Bureau of Empl. Serv.,
8 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 9804 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of America,
337 F. Supp. 1357 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
30. See Dubois v. Packard Bell Corp., 470 F.2d 973, 974 (10th Cir. 1972);
Anderson v. Port Authority, 11 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,799 (W.D Pa. Feb. 12,
1976) (grievance proceeding is not equivalent to state filing); cf., Olson v. Rembrandt
Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228, 1233 (8th Cir. 1975). But see Ortega v. Construction
Laborers Local 390, 396 F. Supp. 976, 982 (D. Conn. 1975) (complainant entitled to
extended federal time period because state accepted untimely claim). In Ortega the
court stated that had the state agency dismissed the complainant's untimely charge, the
complainant would have had the additional 30 days allowed by the act for filing with the
EEOC, despite the fact that the 180 day statutory period had expired. Id. The EEOC
has taken the same position. EEOC Dec. No. 70-007, CCH EEOC DEC. 1 6143
(1973); EEOC Dec. No. 70-43, CCH EEOC DEC. 1 6058 (1973). This construction of
the law is patently wrong because it means that a complainant's otherwise untimely
EEOC charge can be made timely by filing, of an untimely state charge. A complainant
should not be able to "institute' a state proceeding within the meaning of Title VII
without a timely state charge. See Dubois v. Packard Bell Corp., supra at 975.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. V, 1975). Prior submission of the charge to
the state agency is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit under Title VII. Mosley v.
McKee-Wellman Power Gas, 12 CCH EMPL. PRAc. DEc 111,141 (9th Cir. 1976). The
district court need not dismiss the complaint for nondeferral, however; it may retain
jurisdiction and remand for compliance. Id.
32. Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 12 CCH EMPL. PRAC. DEC. 1 11,051, at 4900-02
(4th Cir. 1976).
33. Davis v. Valley Distrib. Co., 522 F.2d 827, 832-33 (9th Cir. 1975), petition for
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defer a charge to the state agency 34 can be corrected after suit has been
instituted even though the state statute of limitations has run and the
state agency lacks jurisdiction to accept the charge. 5
Prior to 1974, a number of courts had held that submission of a
discrimination claim to an arbitrator pursuant to a labor contract tolled
the running of Title VII's statute of limitations pending completion of
the abritration proceedings.36 The United States Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.37 and Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc." seem to have invalidated those cases. In Alex-
ander, the Court ruled that arbitration and Title VII offered independent
and distinct remedies to a complainant. 9 A year later, in Johnson, the
Court issued a similar ruling with respect to the Civil Rights Act of
186640 and Title VII and further held that filing a complaint under
the latter did not toll the statute of limitations applicable to the former.
41
Finally, in December 1976, the Court applied the Johnson rationale
in holding that submission of a discrimination claim to arbitration
would not toll the statute of limitations under Title VII.42 The statute
cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3050 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1975) (No. 75-836); Olson v. Rembrandt
Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228, 1232 (8th Cir. 1975). To allow such a bar would give the
states effective control over the timeliness of Title VII complaints.
34. See note 29 supra.
35. Mosley v. McKee-Wellman Power Gas, 12 CCH EMPL. PRAC. DEC. % 11,141
(9th Cir. 1976). See also Cook v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1217,
1222-23 (D. Ariz. 1975). Presumably, if the state agency declines to accept jurisdiction
of the untimely charge, the plaintiff, having belatedly satisfied the deferral requirement,
will continue with his suit. But cf. Ortega v. Construction & Gen. Laborers' Union, 396
F. Supp. 976, 982 (D. Conn. 1975) (the state agency accepted the untimely charge).
The matter is further complicated because according to its own regulations the EEOC
will not defer charges which would be untimely under state law. 29 C.F.R. §
1601.12(b)(1)(v) (1975). If the EEOC itself is the plaintiff, a failure to properly
defer may be treated more seriously. See EEOC v. Appalachian Power Co., 13 CCH
EMPL. PRAc. DEC. 11,293 (W.D Va. Sept. 10, 1976) (suit dismissed where commis-
sioner's charge not under oath).
36. Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811, 827 (7th Cir. 1972); Malone v. North
Am. Rockwell Corp., 457 F.2d 779, 781 (9th Cir. 1972); Hutchings v. United States
Indus. Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 308-09 (5th Cir. 1970); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970).
37. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
38. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
39. 415 U.S. at 47-49. A complainant's right to pursue his Title VII remedies will
not be affected by the receipt of an adverse decision from the arbitrator, although the
decision may "be admitted as evidence [in a lawsuit under Title VII] and accorded such
weight as the court deems appropriate." Id. at 60.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
41. 421 U.S. at 462-67.
42. Electrical Workers Local 790 v. Robbins & Meyers, Inc., 45 U.S.L.W. 4068
(U.S. Dec. 20, 1976).
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might be tolled, however, by a timely filing in another forum authorized
to consider Title VII claims, such as a government agency which reviews
complaints that affirmative action plans have been violated.4
3
The courts have consistently held that the statute of limitations is
tolled while a discriminatory act is continuing, but they have frequently
disagreed on the definition of "continuing act."4  The controlling
factor in distinguishing a continuing from a noncontinuing act often
seems to be the artfulness displayed in drafting the charge. A charge
alleging a discriminatory failure to recall, for example, may be main-
tained while a charge based on the original layoff would be untimely.45
Although a refusal to hire would certainly appear to be a single,
noncontinuing act,46 some courts have held that it is continuing if the
charging party alleges that his rejection was part of "an ongoing pattern
and practice of discrimination."47 In Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 48
43. It has been held that filing a discrimination complaint with the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) under the provisions of 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.20 to
-1.32 (1975), tolls the statute of limitations under Title VII. EEOC v. Nicholson File
Co., 408 F. Supp. 229, 233-35 (D. Conn. 1976). Such a filing, however, will not
constitute filing with the EEOC. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 12 CCH EMPL.
PRAc. DEc. 1 11,122, at 5191 (E.D Va. 1976). This is true despite an agreement
between the OFCC and the EEOC that filing with the OFCC would constitute filing
with the EEOC. Memorandum of Understanding Between EEOC and OFCC, Sept. 11,
1974, para. 10, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE 1 3780 (1976).
44. Compare Kennar v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 9 CCH Empl, Prac. Dec. 1
9,992 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (layoff not a continuing act); Gordon v. Baker Protective Servs.
Inc., 358 F. Supp. 867, 869 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (demotion not a continuing act), and
McCarty v. Boeing Co., 321 F. Supp. 260, 261 (W.D. Wash. 1970) (payment of
discriminatory pension benefits not a continuing act), with EEOC v. Hickey-Mitchell
Co., 372 F. Supp. 1117, 1120 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (payment of low wages a continuing
act), and Mixson v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 334 F. Supp. 525, 527 (N.D. Ga.
1971) (denial of pension benefits a continuing act).
45. See Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969);
Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F. Supp. 891, 896-97 (D. Me. 1970). A charge
based on failure to recall, however, would only be timely if some employee other than
the charging party was recalled during the 180-day period. Alleman v. T.R.W., Inc., 13
CCH EMPL PRAc. DEC. 1 11,290 (M.D Pa. Sept. 9, 1976).
46. See Smith v. Office of Economic Opportunity, 12 CCH EMPL. PRAc. DEC.
11,082 (8th Cir. July 21, 1976); Molybdenum Corp. of America v. EEOC, 457 F.2d 935
(10th Cir. 1972).
47. E.g., Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974); Watson v. Limback Co., 333 F. Supp.
754, 765 (S.D. Ohio 1971). Contra, Kramer v. Board of Educ., 12 CCH EMPL. PRAc.
DEC. 11 11,136 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1976). As the concept of the continuing act is
expanded to accomodate charging parties whose complaints might otherwise be untimely,
it is seldom remembered that one of the compromises which resulted in passage of the
1964 Civil Rights Act was the inclusion of an extremely short statute of limitations
period on the filing of charges. See Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811, 820-21
(7th Cir. 1972).
48. 534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3329 (U.S. Nov. 2,
1976) (No. 76-333).
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently took
this concept one step further. The court there held that a stewardess's
charge of sex discrimination filed four years after the employer unlawful-
ly terminated her employment and one year after she was reinstated as a
new hire alleged a "continuing" violation because she would have had
greater seniority had she not been dismissed. In holding that a charge
may be timely filed with the EEOC as long as the effects of the
discriminatory act are still being felt, the court virtually deleted the
statute of limitations from Title VII and confused remedial with jurisdic-
tional standards. The court relied upon but misconstrued the decision
of the Supreme Court in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Company.49
The ruling in Bowman that retroactive seniority is an appropriate Title
VII remedy, even where the existing seniority system is facially neutral,
does not support the award of back seniority where the charge of
discrimination is untimely filed. The plaintiffs in Bowman did not
attack the seniority system itself but directed their complaint at the
employer's failure to hire minorities, and that fact was significant. As
the Court noted:
The underlying legal wrong affecting [plaintiffs] is not the alleged
operation of a racially discriminatory seniority system but of a
racially discriminatory hiring system. Petitioners do not ask modi-
fication or elimination of the existing seniority system, but only
an award of the seniority status they would have individually
enjoyed under the present system but for the illegal discriminatory
refusal to hire.50
In Evans, the plaintiff did not (and could not because of the statute of
limitations) attack her dismissal or reinstatement. Thus, because her
complaint was limited to the seniority system itself, Bowman, involving
an attack on discriminatory hiring, was inapplicable.
It is noteworthy that the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, faced with a case comparable to Evans and involving the
same employer, reached an opposite result. In Collins v. United Air
Lines, Inc.,51 a stewardess, who had been terminated pursuant to the
employer's former discriminatory policy and had not been reinstated
when the policy was changed, filed a charge alleging continuing nonem-
ployment. In holding the charge untimely, the court said: "[I]t is the
49. 96 S. Ct. 1251 (1976). The Seventh Circuit reversed an earlier decision in
Evans because of the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Bowman. 11 CCH Empl.
Prac. Dec. 1 10,665 (7th Cir. Jan. 29, 1976).
50. 96 S. Ct. at 1261.
51. 9 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec 1 10,082 (9th Cir. 1975).
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alleged unlawful act or practice-not merely its effects-which must
have occurred within the 90 days [now 180] preceding the filing of
charges before the EEOC."52
The statute of limitations under Title VII should begin to run when
the aggrieved person obtains knowledge, or should reasonably have
obtained knowledge, of the injury." Application of this concept to the
Evans case would have barred the plaintiff's claim because, under the
circumstances of the case, the plaintiff should have known for several
years prior to filing her charge that she had been adversely affected by
the employer's discriminatory practice. 4 In Reeb v. Economic Oppor-
tunity Atlanta, Inc.,"s the Fifth Circuit held that it was error to dismiss
a complaint on the ground that the underlying charge had been filed
with the EEOC more than ninety days after the plaintiff's discharge, 56
because the plaintiff did not have grounds to believe that she had been
discriminated against until shortly before she filed the charge. The
court noted that "[t]he statute does not begin to run until the facts
which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be
apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights." 57
If the employer believes that the charge does not allege a continu-
ing unlawful act and is otherwise untimely, he may test the accuracy of
52. Id. at 7417; accord, Hayes v. Southern Pac. Co., 12 CCH EMPL. PRAc. Dnc.
11,196, at 5504 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 1976).
53. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946) (fraud); Ciccarone v.
United States, 486 F.2d 253, 256 (3rd Cir. 1973) (medical malpractice); Jones v. Rogers
Memorial Hosp., 442 F.2d 773, 774-75 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (medical malpractice); 37 AM.
Jut. 2d Fraud & Deceit § 405 (1968); Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368, 387-96 (1961) (medical
malpractice).
54. Plaintiff had been discharged in February 1968. In November 1968, the
employer and the union agreed to reinstate all stewardesses who had been terminated
pursuant to the unlawful policy and who had filed either grievances under the labor
contract or charges with some antidiscrimination agency. 534 F.2d at 1248 n.2. The
plaintiff had done neither and was therefore not reinstated. She should have known at
that time that she had been injured. She was then hired as a new employee in February
1972, and began to accrue seniority anew. Id. at 1248. She could reasonably have been
expected at that time to know that she had been disadvantaged. Nevertheless, she did
not file her charge until February 1973-5 years after her termination, 4 years after
the agreement eliminating the unlawful policy and reinstating many of the stewardesses,
and 1 year after her rehire without retroactive seniority. Id.; see Cates v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc. 12 CCH EMPL PRAc. DEC f 11,137, at 5241 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1976).
55. 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975).
56. The limitations period on filing a charge with the EEOC was 90 days until the
1972 amendment extended it to 180 days. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Tit. VII, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, § 706, 78 Stat. 259, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. V, 1975).
57. 516 F 2d at 930. See also Antonopulos v. Aerojet-General Corp., 295 F. Supp.
1390, 1394 (E.D. Cal. 1968).
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his belief by refusing to cooperate with the EEOC during its investiga-
tion. The commission will then issue and seek judicial enforcement of
an investigative subpoena, at which time the employer may challenge
the commission's jurisdiction. There are two pitfalls in this ap-
proach: (1) the court may find that a determination of whether the
alleged unlawful act is continuing cannot be made until after the com-
mission's investigation of the charge;58 or (2) the court may simply
allow the charging party to amend his charge so that a continuing act is
alleged.5 9 Accordingly, an employer should avoid a premature judicial
challenge unless it is patently clear that only a single isolated discrimina-
tory act is or can be charged. Another opportunity to challenge the
timeliness of the original charge by asserting the absence of a continuing
act will come if and when a lawsuit is filed by the EEOC or by the
charging party. 0
Prior to the 1972 amendments, Title VII required the EEOC to
furnish the employer with a copy of the charge."' Now, however, the
statute merely requires service of notice of the charge, stating the date,
place, and circumstances of the alleged violation.62 Such service is to be
accomplished within ten days after the charge is filed. 68  Regardless of
this requirement, the EEOC's failure to send timely notice of the charge
has been held no bar to a subsequent suit filed by the charging party,
since it is the policy of the courts not to penalize the individual for the
agency's neglect. 64 On the other hand, a suit filed by the EEOC itself
58. See, e.g., Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. Quinn, 491 F.2d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir.
1974).
59. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11 (b) (1975). But see cases cited note 26 supra.
60. See Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F. Supp. 1338, 1340 (D. Hawaii 1974).
61. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(a), 78 Stat. 259, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V, 1975). Several state antidiscrimination
statutes still require that the employer receive a copy of the charge. See, e.g., ARIz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 41-1481(B) (1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 712(b) (1974); ILL. ANN.
STAT., ch. 48, § 858 (Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.06(1) (1966); N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 297(2) (McKinney 1972).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V, 1975). If the notice is incomplete, but the
employer thereafter becomes aware of the missing elements and suffers no prejudice, the
flaw will not require dismissal of the lawsuit. See EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 382 F.
Supp. 787, 790-91 (D. Md. 1974); Latino v. Rainbo Bakers, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 870, 872
(D. Colo. 1973).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V, 1975). Prior to 1972, there was no time
limit on service of the charge, and service within any "reasonable" time was approved by
the courts. See Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972); Washington
v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 324 F. Supp. 849, 854-55 (W.D. La. 1971).
64. Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1361, 1367 (E.D. Va. 1975);
Healen v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 9 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,023, at 7237 (N.D. Ga.
1973); Foyer v. United A.G. Stores Coop., Inc, 336 F. Supp. 82, 83 (D. Neb. 1972).
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may be dismissed if the commission fails to provide the respondent with
notice of the charge within ten days.65
The EEOC has modified some of these statutory requirements by
regulation. For example, the commission recently adopted a regulation
pursuant to which it will serve a copy of the charge on the respondent
within the notice period except when such service "would impede the
law enforcement functions of the Commission."66 A second modifica-
tion involves identifying the charging party. As noted above, the statute
does not require that notice of the charge disclose the name of the
complainant, and there was a time when the commission's policy was to
withhold the identity of the person filing the charge.6 7  That policy,
however, is no longer in effect. The EEOC Compliance Manual, which
sets forth the procedures and guidelines to be followed by commission
staff members, now states that "[t]he notice must contain [the] name
" 68of [the] person filing the charge ....
As a practical matter, in most jurisdictions it may be several
months before the EEOC even begins its investigation of the charge.69
Generally, however, EEOC delays in processing cases due to its admin-
istrative overload have not been accepted as grounds for dismissal of the
subsequent legal action.70  An exception might occur where the em-
ployer can demonstrate that the delay was prejudicial, as, for example,
when it results in his inability to locate necessary witnesses or evi-
dence.7 1 Attacks on the sufficiency of the charge, its clarity, the
65. See EEOC v. Air Guide Corp., 539 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1976) (court
indicated suit would be dismissed if employer suffered prejudice from delay).
66. 41 Fed. Reg. 34745 (1976). If the commission decides to serve only the
statutory notice, a copy of the charge will be served when the investigation begins. CCH
EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 10.8 (1976).
67. See EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 382 F. Supp. 787, 790 (D. Md. 1974); 29
C.F.R. § 1601.13 (1975); CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 10.7 (1976).
68. CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 10.3 (1976).
69. The EEOC has conceded that it often takes more than two years to process a
charge. 9 EEOC ANN. REP. 8 (1974).
70. See, e.g., Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972).
71. See EEOC v. North Hills Passavant Hosp., 12 CCH EMPL. PRAc. DEC.
11,229, at 5702 (3d Cir. Nov. 4, 1976) (suit filed three years after charge not barred by
laches where prejudice to employer not shown); EEOC v. Moore Group, Inc., 11 CCH
Empl Prac. Dec. f 10,886 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (suit filed 5 years after charge is barred by
laches); EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 303 (M.D. Ga. 1975)
(suit filed 5 years after charge is barred by laches); EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 10 CCH
Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,246 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (defense of laches not maintained in
absence of unreasonable delay and prejudice); EEOC v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm., 7
CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 9,334 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (6 year delay between charge and suit
does not warrant dismissal). See also EEOC v. American Mach. & Foundry, Inc., 12
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complainant's standing, or failure to comply with technical regulations
are unlikely to meet with much success. The courts tend to construe
such requirements liberally in favor of the complainant. 7'2  A lawsuit
instituted by the EEOC, on the other hand, may well be subject to
dismissal if the agency has violated its own regulations and the employer
has suffered prejudice thereby. 3
The Investigation
Once the charge has been filed and the EEOC supervisor's prein-
vestigation analysis has been completed, the case will be assigned to an
investigator. 74  This individual is generally not an attorney, and he may,
in fact, be unfamiliar with the complexities of Title VII. He is also
unlikely to have substantial business training or economic knowledge.
Nevertheless, he has primary responsibility for conducting the investiga-
tion, evaluating the documentary and testimonial evidence, and recom-
mending the determination that will eventually appear over the district
director's signature. The employer's ability to deal with the investigator
will be enhanced by an understanding of the extent and limitations of
the investigative function.
The respondent-employer is likely to be confronted with a number
of requests for information and documents at the beginning of the investi-
gation. The EEOC representative may, for example, ask to interview
employees, to review personnel files and job applications, and to obtain
lists of employees hired, fired, promoted, transferred, laid off, or re-
called. He may ask the employer to compile data from his records or to
CCH EMPL. PRAC. DEC. 1 11,200, at 5524-25 (M.D Pa. Aug. 26, 1976) (claims for
back pay barred by laches in view of 5 year delay in filing suit); Stallworth v. Monsanto
Co., 9 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. V 10,045 (N.D. Fla. 1975) (laches results in reduction of
back pay award).
72. See, e.g., Ferguson v The Kroger Co., 12 CCH EMPL. PRAC. DEC. 11,233
(6th Cir. Oct. 26, 1976); EEOC v. Wah Chang Albany Corp., 499 F.2d 187, 189-90
(9th Cir. 1974); Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 462-64 (5th Cir.
1970). See also Ramos v. Port Authority, 12 CCH EMPL. PRAC. DEC. 11,035, at
4818-19 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 1976) (reliance on erroneous information from EEOC
prevents bar to complainant's suit). But cf. McCrary v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 12
CCH EMPL. PRAc. DEC. 11,198 (D. Mass. Feb. 18, 1976) (plaintiffs suit dismissed as
untimely even though delay caused by EEOC's efforts to obtain an attorney for her);
Lynn v. Western Gillette, Inc., 11 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec 10,882 (D. Ariz. 1975)
(EEOC misinformation no longer causative once plaintiff obtains attorney).
73. See cases cited notes 65 & 71 supra. See also EEOC v. Hickey-Mitchell Co.,
507 F.2d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 1974); EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 382 F. Supp. 787, 796-
97 (D. Md. 1974); EEOC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 366 F. Supp. 273, 278 (D.
Md. 1973).
74. CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL §§ 8, 20.1-.2 (1976).
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produce statistical information about his current staff.78 He may serve
administrative interrogatories7 6 and subpoenas for the production of
documents or witnesses. He may seek to probe into matters which
occurred years before the charge was filed7 7 and into areas beyond the
scope of the allegations contained in the charge.7 8  Significantly, the
fruits of the investigator's research may later serve as the basis for a
lawsuit by the EEOC, by the charging party, 9 or by some third party
whose claim develops from facts disclosed during the investigation."8
The employer appears to be on the horns of a dilemma. If he
vigorously resists the investigator's efforts, he may well be rewarded with
an adverse ruling.81 On the other hand, if he is overly and unnecessari-
ly cooperative, he may sow the seeds for a damaging lawsuit against his
company. The danger of being too submissive is highlighted by two
federal appeals cases. In the first of these cases, Sanchez v. Standard
Brands, Inc.,82 the employer sought to limit the scope of the plaintiff's
lawsuit to the claims made in the original charge filed with the EEOC.
75. The EEOC has the statutory authority to establish recordkeeping requirements
applicable to all employers covered by Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) (Supp. V,
1975). It has exercised that power; its regulations require employers to maintain all
personnel records for a period of six months and to maintain all records relevant to a
charge until the disposition of the case. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (1975). What is relevant
to the charge is very broadly construed by the regulation: "The term 'personnel records
relevant to the charge,' for example, would include personnel or employment records
relating to the aggrieved person and to all other employees holding positions similar to
that held or sought by the aggrieved person and application forms or test papers
completed by an unsuccessful applicant and by all other candidates for the same position
as that for which the aggrieved person applied and was rejected." Id. (emphasis added).
76. One court has held that the commission has no authority to issue compulsory
interrogatories, pointing out that the statute, the regulations, and the EEOC Compliance
Manual do not provide for such a discovery method. EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 382 F.
Supp. 787, 793-95 (D. Md. 1974).
77. See Linderme Tube Co. v. EEOC, 4 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 7522 (N.D. Ohio
1971) (demand for five years of employee records was "reasonable").
78. See EEOC v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 11 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec.
10,935 (D. Md. May 4, 1976).
79. See H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 472 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973) (complainant entitled to access to EEOC investigative file
on his charge).
80. See National Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Walsh, 12 CCH EMPL. PRAC. DEC.
11,116 (D.D.C. July 29, 1976); Mosley v. General Motors, Corp., 10 CCH Empl. Prac.
Dec. 110,380 (E.D Mo. 1975).
81. The EEOC has adopted the National Labor Relations Board's "adverse infer-
ence" rule, under which an employer's unreasonable refusal to present relevant evidence
gives rise to an inference that such evidence is adverse to his position. CCH EEOC
COMPLANCE MANUAL § 161 (1976); see P.R. Mallory & Co. v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 956,
959 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969).
82. 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970).
Rejecting this request, the Fifth Circuit held that the purpose of a
charge is "to trigger the investigatory and conciliatory procedures of the
EEOC" and that, accordingly, "it is only logical to limit the permissible
scope of the civil action to the scope of the EEOC investigation which
can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimina-
tion."'8 3  The Fifth Circuit's holding in Sanchez has been adopted by a
substantial number of federal district courts, which have ruled that an
individual's lawsuit under Title VII may encompass any discriminatory
practices which are uncovered by the EEOC during a reasonable investi-
gation of the charge and which are "like or related" to that charge.s4 A
suit filed by the EEOC may challenge even those practices not related to
the charge if they were discovered during a reasonable investigation of
the charge."5
The second case illustrating the importance of avoiding blind
compliance with EEOC requests for evidence is EEOC v. Occidental
Life Insurance Co.8 6 In that case, the charge alleged sex discrimination
based on the employer's refusal to grant maternity leave. During its
investigation, the EEOC requested and obtained, apparently without
objection, evidence indicating that male employees had been discrim-
inated against in the company's retirement system. When the EEOC
83. Id. at 466 (emphasis added); see Gamble v. Birmingham S.R.R., 514 F.2d 678,
688-89 (5th Cir. 1975). Gamble expanded Sanchez by holding that a charging party's
lawsuit may properly challenge any discriminatory practices which are "of the same type
and character as that originally charged," even if such practices were not themselves the
subject of an investigation. Id. at 689. One court, going beyond Sanchez and Gamble,
recently held that the private court action may encompass any allegations the plaintiff
previously presented to the EEOC, notwithstanding the failure of the commission to
investigate such allegations. Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 409 F. Supp. 1083, 1089
(N.D. Tex. 1976) (denying motion to strike claims of sex discrimination where EEOC
investigated only racial discrimination). This holding, though unlikely to be followed by
other courts, places the employer in a difficult position. In Gamble, the employer at
least had notice of the kind of discrimination with which he was charged and could
preserve the appropriate evidence to defend himself. In Vuyanich, he had no reason
prior to trial to know that he would have to defend against sex discrimination as well as
racial discrimination charges. Cf. EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 368 (4th
Cir. 1976).
84. See, e.g., Jiron v. Sperry Rand Corp., 9 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 9990 (D.
Utah 1975); Ortega v. Construction Laborers Local 390, 396 F. Supp. 976, 980-81 (D.
Conn. 1975); Scott v. University of Del., 385 F. Supp. 937, 942-43 (D. Del. 1974).
85. EEOC v. American Mach. & Foundry, Inc., 12 CCH EMPL. PRAc. DEC.
11,200, at 5526 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1976); EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 411 F.
Supp. 97 (W.D. Pa. 1976); EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 382 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Md.
1974). EEOC investigators are encouraged to be on the lookout for nonalleged
violations. CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 25.3 (1976).
86. 535 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3101 (U.S.
July 23, 1976) (No. 76-99).
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thereafter filed suit, including in the complaint allegations about the
retirement system, the employer moved to have the allegations stricken as
beyond the scope of the original charge. The district court granted the
motion, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. Noting that the EEOC has the
right to obtain access to all evidence reasonably related to the charge,
the court held that, because the employer had allowed the EEOC access
to evidence regarding the retirement program, it was precluded from
claiming that such evidence was not related to the original charge. The
court stated:
Had [the employer] believed that the EEOC's investigation ex-
ceeded the permissible statutory scope, it could have refused the
EEOC's demand for access and sought adjudication of its rights.
[The employer] did not do so. Thus we can only conclude that
the EEOC investigation was reasonable and that the information
supporting the allegations in subparagraphs 8(b) and 9(c) [of
the complaint] was acquired during that reasonable investigation.87
The lesson to be learned from these decisions of the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits is that an employer's exposure to liability under Title VII
is as broad as the scope of the EEOC's investigation. 8 The employer
will be in a position to exert some degree of influence over the scope of
the investigative effort if he develops an understanding of the tech-
niques, objectives, and limitations of the investigator and if he is not
reluctant to act when the investigator appears to be digressing improper-
ly.
Investigative Tools and Techniques
The investigator is a researcher, and the respondent's personnel
files are his primary sources. His access to those files, insofar as the
material sought is relevant to the charge, 9 is virtually unlimited. Thus,
he is generally entitled to payroll records,9 0 disciplinary files,"' seniority
87. Id. at 541 (footnotes omitted); accord, EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d
359, 368 (4th Cir 1976). In General Electric, the employer's voluntary production of
evidence indicating sex discrimination, during an EEOC investigation of racial dscrimi-
nation, resulted in judicial approval of a complaint charging both sex and race discrimi-
nation.
88. The EEOC may also institute additional proceedings against the employer
based on the results of its investigations in other cases. See EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1363 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975); EEOC v.
Huttig Sash & Door Co., 511 F.2d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1975).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1970).
90, EEOC v. Ducommun Metals & Supply Co., 2 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,067
(S.D. Tex. 1969); EEOC v. Fram Corp., 2 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,034 (N.D.
Okla. 1969).
91. Molybdenum Corp. of America v EEOC, 2 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 10,010
(D.N. Mex. 1969).
information,92 and job applications.93 The investigator can obtain a list
of employees indicating, as relevant, their race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin.94 He may lawfully demand access to the personnel files
of past and present employees in order to compare their records with
those of the charging party.9 5 He may insist on a tour of the employer's
facilities96 and may interview employees either informally or under
oath.97 The investigator's requests must, however, be specific and
reasonably calculated to lead to the production of anticipated data; he
cannot engage in a blind "fishing expedition,' '9 8 and requests which are
overly broad will not be enforced. 99
Theoretically, the EEOC investigation is not an adversary proceed-
ing. The investigator's task is merely to examine the facts to determine
whether there is any substance to the claims of the charging party.
Realistically, however, his raison d'etre is to eliminate discrimination,
and the more zealous he is in pursuit of this goal, the more antagonistic
the relationship between the investigator and the employer may become.
When an investigator exceeds the bounds of proper conduct in his
92. Motorola, Inc. v. McLain, 484 F.2d 1339, 1346 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 936 (1974).
93. EEOC v. Gibson Prods. Co., 1 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 9915 (M.D. Ga.
1968).
94. Id. See also H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 53 F.R D. 330, 336-37 (N.D. Ga.
1971), aff'd, 468 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds en banc, 472 F.2d
1147 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
95. EEOC v. University of N.M., 504 F.2d 1296, 1306 (10th Cir. 1974).
96. Motorola, Inc. v. McLain, 484 F.2d 1339, 1346 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 936 (1974). The employer should restrict the tour to those areas of the plant
relevant to the charge at issue because the EEOC investigator will be watchful for other
unalleged violations during his tour. Should he observe areas in which the employees
are predominantely Caucasian or where substantial numbers of minority employees are
in lower-classified jobs, further charges may be filed.
97. See Merkle Press, Inc. v. EEOC, 4 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 7816 (D.D.C.
1972).
98. EEOC v. University of N.M., 504 F.2d 1296, 1301-02 (10th Cir. 1974);
Parliament House Motor Hotel v. EEOC, 444 F.2d 1335, 1339 (5th Cir. 1971).
99. E.g., Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 483 F.2d 178, 184 (10th Cir. 1973); H.
Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 53 F.R.D. 330, 336 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 468 F.2d 25 (5th
Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds en banc, 472 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 939 (1973). "It is endemic to investigators to use the foot-in-the-door approach
to try to expand their jurisdiction and to claim the right to investigate anything they
think interesting which may remotely concern any matter about which they are inquir-
ing." Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 336 F. Supp. 941, 947 (D. Colo. 1971), modified
on other grounds, supra. The EEOC's position is that the allegations of the charge "do
not define the parameters of an investigation and analysis. . . . A thorough analysis
must deal with nonalleged issues related to the issues alleged by the charging party."
CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 26.2(b) (1976).
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efforts to establish a case, the employer can obtain judicial protection. If
the investigator harasses employees, interferes with the operation of the
employer's business, damages the employer's reputation or standing, or
otherwise utilizes improper investigative measures, the employer may be
able to obtain a court order terminating such measures and restricting
the use of evidence resulting therefrom. For example, one court ex-
cluded all evidence obtained by means of an EEOC-sponsored newspa-
per advertisement which indicated that the respondent-employer had
been charged with racial discrimination and solicited the assistance of
applicants who had unsuccessfully sought jobs with the respondent.100
Another court refused to allow the commission to use compulsory
interrogatories, ruling that the agency had no authority to issue them. 01
A third court refused to enforce a subpoena duces tecum that the
commission had addressed to respondent's attorney rather than to the
corporate officer in possession and control of the records sought by the
agency.10 2
Four topics relating to the EEOC's investigative tools and tech-
niques deserve special attention: the agency's use of subpoenas, the
investigator's right to interview employees, the extent of the employer's
obligation to compile data at the commission's request, and the use of
statistics.
Use of Subpoenas
Prior to the 1972 amendments to Title VII, section 710 of the act
provided that the EEOC had the authority to "demand" both access to
evidence and the appearance of witnesses; 03 such demands could be
enforced or challenged in court.' 0 4  Section 710, as amended, 10 5 now
provides that section 11 of the National Labor Relations Act,10 which
specifies the investigative powers of the National Labor Relations Board,
shall be applicable to EEOC investigations. Pursuant to this provision,
the EEOC has the power to issue subpoenas, rather than "demands," for
100. EEOC v. Red Arrow Corp., 392 F. Supp. 64 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
101. EEOC v. Western Elee. Co., 382 F. Supp. 787, 793-95 (D. Md. 1974).
102. EEOC v. South Carolina Natl Bank, 11 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,932
(D.S.C. Mar. 25, 1976).
103. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 710, 78 Stat. 264.
104. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ducommun Metals & Supply Co., 2 CCII Empl. Prac. Dec.
10,067 (S.D. Tex. 1969); Molybdenum Corp. of America v. EEOC, 2 CCH Empl.
Prac. Dec. 10,010 (D.N.M. 1969).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (1970).
106. 29 U.S.C. § 161 (Supp. V, 1975).
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the production of witnesses and evidence. 10 7  The service of such sub-
poenas is not limited to persons who are parties to the charge under
investigation but may extend to any person in possession of evidence
relevant to the charge.108
One distinction between the subpoena power of the EEOC and that
of the NLRB is that the EEOC's regulations prohibit the issuance of
subpoenas at the request of either the charging party or the respondent,
while the NLRB is subject to no such restriction. 0 9 From the employ-
er's viewpoint, this difference is a serious and unfortunate one, since he
may need to compel a third party to produce exculpatory evidence. The
commission's regulation barring the issuance of such a subpoena unrea-
sonably deprives the employer of an important protection and appears to
be contrary to the express stipulation of the act providing for the
application of the NLRA investigative procedures.
There are several possible grounds upon which an EEOC subpoena
could be challenged. Subpoenas issued long after the filing of a charge
may be invalidated if the delay prejudices the employer. 110 A challenge
might also be maintained in cases where the subpoena is addressed to one
not in possession or control of the records sought"' or where the
commission has not properly obtained jurisdiction (e.g., where it has
107. The EEOC's stated policy is to resort to the use of subpoenas "only after
normal investigative methods have been exhausted." CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL
§ 24.1(a) (1976).
108. EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1096 (6th Cir.
1974); EEOC v. National Elec. Benefit Fund, 11 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,801
(D.D.C. Apr. 1, 1976); cf. Link v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 437, 439-40 (4th Cir. 1964);
NLRB v. Lewis, 310 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1962).
109. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1601.15(a) (1975), with 29 C.F.R. § 102.31 (1976)
(issuance of subpoenas by NLRB). In one case involving the NLRB, the Fifth Circuit
stated: "Certainly respondent had the same right as the Board to have the examiner
issue subpoenas on its behalf and if his failure to do so had resulted in depriving
respondent of substantial evidence, we should order the case sent back for the taking of
that testimony." NLRB v. Ed. Friedrich, Inc., 116 F.2d 888, 889 (5th Cir. 1940). See
also Fair Housing Act § 811(b), 42 U.S.C. § 3611(b) (1970). Under this provision,
respondents being investigated for alleged discrimination in housing are entitled to the
issuance of subpoenas on their behalf "to the same extent and subject to the same
limitations" as the investigating agency.
110. See EEOC v. Exchange Sec. Bank, 529 F.2d 1214, 1216 (5th Cir. 1976)
(subpoena issued twenty-one months after charge must bz enforced where respondent
failed to show prejudice); EEOC v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 11 CCH Empl. Prac.
Dec. 10,932, at 7934 (D.S.C. Mar. 25, 1976) (four year delay); EEOC v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 11 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 10,935, at 7951-52 (D. Md.
May 4, 1976) (subpoena issued twenty-seven months after charge must be enforced
where respondent failed to show prejudice).
111. EEOC v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 11 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,932
(D.S.C. Mar. 25, 1976).
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neglected to defer to the state or local agency) .112 On the other hand, an
EEOC subpoena cannot be successfully attacked on the grounds that the
underlying charge is frivolous or false," 3 that the commission failed to
serve notice of the charge within the time specified by statute, absent a
showing of prejudice," 4 or that the charge is untimely, if the charging
party alleges a continuing act and an EEOC investigation is necessary to
determine if in fact the discriminatory practice is continuing." 5 Even if
the complainant seeks to withdraw his charge, the EEOC may proceed
with its investigation of the case and obtain enforcement of its subpoena,
since withdrawal can only be effected with the commission's consent," 6
and the paternalistic nature of the statute seems to require protection of
a complainant whose decision to withdraw may not be entirely volunta-
ry. 1 1 7
Prior to enactment of the 1972 amendments, a respondent-employ-
er could initiate a judicial review of an EEOC demand for evidence by
petitioning the court to modify or vacate the demand."" His failure to
do so was considered a bar to contesting enforcement." 9  The present
statute provides no such judicial procedure. The respondent who wish-
112. See Nueces County Hosp. Dist. v. EEOC, 518 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1975);
EEOC v. Union Bank, 408 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1968); cf. EEOC v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 10 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,549 (D. Md. 1975), afid, 12 CCH EMPL.
PRAC. DEC. 1111,017 (4th Cir. June 29, 1976) (deferral unnecessary where it was clear
state would not accept charge).
113. See EEOC v. Quick Stop Mkts. Inc., 526 F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1975); Granite-
ville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32, 36 (4th Cir. 1971); Hardwick Stove Co. v. EEOC, 5
CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 8514 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), ajf'd, 5 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 1
8515 (6th Cir. 1973).
114. Chromcraft v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745, 747-48 (5th Cir. 1972).
115. EEOC v. Western Pub. Co., 502 F.2d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 1974); Pacific
Maritime Ass'n v. Quinn, 491 F.2d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1974).
116. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.9 (1975).
117. EEOC v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 11 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. f
10,935, at 7956 (D. Md. May 4, 1976); Allstate Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 4 CCH Empl. Prac.
Dec. % 7692 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Indeed, because the EEOC defends the public interest as
well as the interest of the charging party, even the death of the complainant will not bar
the EEOC from proceeding. EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 97 (W.D.
Pa. 1976).
118. Until 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9(c) (1970) provided: "(c) Within twenty
days after the service upon any person charged under section 2000e-5 of this title of a
demand by the Commission for the production of documentary evidence or for permis-
sion to examine or to copy evidence in conformity with the provisions of section 2000e-
8(a) of this title, such person may file in the district court of the United States for the
judicial district in which he resides, is found, or transacts business, and serve upon the
Commission a petition for an order of such court modifying or setting aside such
demand. .. ."
119. Overnite Transp. Co. v. EEOC, 397 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1968).
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es to challenge an EEOC subpoena in court apparently must wait for the
commission to bring an action for its enforcement. 12 0  The commis-
sion's regulations establish procedures for administrative review of the
subpoena,12 ' but it does not appear that the employer must utilize these
procedures in order to preserve his rights. 122
Employee Interviews
The EEOC investigator will seek to interview the respondent's
employees after a charge has been filed, but the employer is under no
legal obligation to make his employees available for private interviews
during working hours. 123  The extent of the employer's voluntary coop-
eration in this aspect of the investigation, as a practical matter, will be a
function of the testimony he expects the employee to offer. The right of
the respondent-employer to have his representative-for example, a
supervisor or an attorney-present during such interviews depends upon
the status of the employee, the location of the interview, and the
willingness of the employee to meet with the investigator privately. The
120. Foreman v. Thalmayer, 10 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,282 (N.D. Tex.
1975); Steck-Vaughan Co. v. EEOC, 7 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 9119 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
The court would have jurisdiction over the employer's petition for review of an EEOC
subpoena if the EEOC counterclaimed for enforcement of the subpoena. See, e.g., New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Brown, 507 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1975) (by implication); cf.
Elliott v. American Mfg. Co., 138 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1943) (under NLRA). In a
judicial proceeding for enforcement of a subpoena, the respondent will not be allowed to
take discovery of the EEOC in order to establish that the agency has no need for the
evidence subpoenaed. Wurlitzer Co. v. EEOC, 50 F.R.D. 421, 424-25 (N.D. Miss.
1970). But see Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 1 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec.
9974 (E.D. La. 1969).
121. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.15(b) (1975). Under this regulation, the director of
compliance makes the initial determination of the objections to the subpoena. The
EEOC is then supposed to review that determination. The decision becomes final within
three days of issuance unless the commission acts to overrule it. The commission's
passive acquiescence has been challenged as producing an improper delegation of
authority, but that challenge has been rejected. EEOC v. Exchange Sec. Bank, 529 F.2d
1214, 1218-19 (5th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 11 CCH
Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,935, at 7949-51 (D. Md. May. 4, 1976).
122. In a recent case the Fifth Circuit held that the employer was not required to
respond to a subpoena prior to the EEOC's application for judicial enforcement. Once
the commission sought enforcement, due process would compel the court to allow his
challenge. EEOC v. Exchange Sec. Bank, 529 F.2d 1214, 1217 (5th Cir. 1976). In
Overnite Transp. Co. v. EEOC, 397 F.2d 368, 370 (5th Cir. 1968), the court re-
fused to allow objections to an EEOC demand when such objections had not been
made in a petition to modify or set aside the demand as provided by the pre-1972 section
710(c). Cf. NLRB v. Gemalo, 130 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (dictum).
123. But see Merkle Press, Inc. v. EEOC, 4 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 7816 (D.D.C.
1972).
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employer has a clear right, recognized by the EEOC,12 4 to be present
when the investigator interviews supervisory or managerial employees,
because the employer may well be bound on an agency theory by the
acts and admissions of such employees. 125  This right is based on the
requirements of due process: since the statements of supervisors may
often, as a matter of law, be attributed to the employer and result in
substantial liability, fairness mandates that the employer be allowed
representation when the government seeks to elicit such statements. If
the EEOC conducts interviews of supervisors without according the
employer proper notice or an opportunity to be present and the employ-
er is prejudiced thereby, it is arguable that the improperly obtained
evidence should be excluded. 129
Employers may instruct their managers and supervisors to refuse to
be interviewed by EEOC investigators unless the interview is conducted
in the presence of the employer or his attorney. The employer, how-
ever, must depend on the employees' loyalty, rather than the threat of
reprisal, for implementation of such directions. If an employer disci-
plines a managerial employee who voluntarily meets with the investiga-
tor in private, he violates section 704(a) of the act, which makes it
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because he
has "testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding or hearing under this subchapter.' 2 7
124. "Attorney's presence-R may insist on having their attorney present during the
interview with R, as well as with any R witness. It is R's right to have counsel present
during their own interview. However, distinguish between salaried and hourly paid
employees. Those on salary are usually part of management and therefore 'Respon-
dents.' Consequently, R's request for an attorney to be present should be honored even
when it requires setting up a new apointment. Hourly paid employees, on the other
hand, are not part of management; if R remains adamant in their requests for an
attorney, make arrangements to talk with these persons at another time, away from R's
premises, if possible." CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 23.2(c)(3) (1976). See
also NLRB FIELD MANUAL § 10056.5 (rev. ed. 1971).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970) defines "employer" to include "any agent of such
a person." See Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424, 436 (D. Utah 1971);
Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., 3 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. [ 8282, at 6946
(W.D. Ky. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1972); cf. Furr's, Inc. v. NLRB, 381
F.2d 562, 566 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
126. See Singer Co. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 172, 178 (8th Cir. 1970); Montgomery
Ward & Co., 187 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 1971 CCH NLRB [ 22,660, at 29,309-10 (1971).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1970). Similarly, section 8(a) (4) of the National
Labor Relations Act provides that an employer commits an unfair labor practice if he
discharges or otherwise discriminates against an employee who has "given testimony" to
the NLRB. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (4) (1970). This provision may include supervisory
and managerial employees. See, e.g., NLRB v. Schill Steel Prods., Inc., 480 F.2d 586, 594
(5th Cir. 1973); King Radio Corp. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 14, 22 (10th Cir. 1968).
The acts and statements of nonmanagerial employees cannot, of
course, be attributed to the respondent-employer in a discrimination
case, and therefore the employer does not have the right to be present
during their interviews. The EEOC's stated policy, however, is to grant
him that right, if he insists, in interviews conducted at the employer's
place of business during working hours.128 The commission will not
notify the employer when it conducts private, off-site interviews of his
nonmanagerial employees. In certain cases, as for example where
witnesses are reluctant but essential, the commission will resort to the use
of a subpoena ad testificandum. In these situations, the EEOC's policy
is to notify respondent's attorney of the time and place at which the
witness's deposition will be taken and to afford the attorney an opportu-
nity to examine the witness. 2 ' Failure to give such notice or to allow
participation would probably render the resulting deposition inadmissi-
ble in a subsequent court proceeding. 13 0
The employer's participation in the witness interviewing process
need not be limited to attending interviews conducted by the EEOC
investigator. The employer has the right to confer independently with
whomever he believes has information pertinent to the charge, including
the complainant. He must, however, be discreet in his questioning so as
to avoid the appearance of harassment or reprisal for the filing of the
charge or the the witness's cooperation with the EEOC."' According-
ly, the employer would be wise to preface any such questioning with a
declaration that the individual's participation in the discussion is totally
voluntary, that his job will not be affected by his responses to questions,
and that the act prohibits retaliation against those who assist in an
EEOC investigation. The questioning should then be conducted in a
Although the NLRB's policy is to allow an employer the opportunity to be present when
supervisors are interviewed during an investigation, the board will respect the supervisor's
request for privacy. "This policy does not preclude the Board agent from receiving
information from a supervisor or agent of the charged party where the individual comes
forward voluntarily, or where the individual specifically indicates that he does not wish
to have the charged party's counsel or representative present." NLRB FIELD MANUAL §
10056.5 (rev. ed. 1971).
128. See CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 23.3(b) (1976). The manual
instructs investigators to "politely resist" the employer's request that he be allowed to be
present during interviews. If the employer insists, the investigator is to inform him that
the interview report will indicate his presence and be weighed accordingly.
129. CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 24.3(d)(3) (1976).
130. See FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a).
131. See text accompanying note 127 supra. See also CCH EEOC Dec. 6123
(1973) (employer's promise of benefits to charging party in return for withdrawal of
charge is not unlawful harassment).
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noncoercive, nonintimidating manner.182 These interviews should be
conducted immediately upon receipt by the employer of notice of the
charge. Testimony should be preserved in written statements, to be
available in the event that the memories of witnesses have dimmed by
the time the EEOC investigation begins many months later. 133
Requests for Compilation of Data
The EEOC investigator may ask the respondent to supply him with
lists of employees divided into certain relevant categories, to produce an
analysis of payroll, hiring, or discipline records, or to compile other data
from his files. Compliance with these requests may be burdensome,
time-consuming, and expensive. Applying principles derived from the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a number of courts have enforced
EEOC subpoenas for evidence which could be abstracted or prepared
from existing records but have declined to compel employers to "com-
pile information or prepare research or other summaries not normally
required under traditional standards of discovery.1 34  There has, how-
ever, been some disagreement among the courts as to what constitutes a
proper request for compilation of data, and judicial responses to em-
ployer challenges to such requests have varied based on the particular
facts of each case.
While no reliable consensus has emerged, an examination of the
cases does reveal that the judiciary has sought to balance the probative
value and relevance of the evidence sought against the burden and cost
of production to the employer. 3 ' In H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC,3 6 for
example, the court enforced the commission's demand for a list of all
persons employed by the respondent over the previous two years, indi-
132. Cf. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 1976-77 (CCI-
NLRB 1 17,219; Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 N L.R.B. 770, 775 (1964), enforcement
denied, 344 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1965).
133. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26, 33, 34, 45.
134. United States Steel Corp. v. EEOC, 6 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 8980, at 6169
(W.D. Pa.), a!f'd, 6 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. % 8981 (3d Cir. 1973); H. Kessler & Co. v.
EEOC, 53 F.R.D. 330, 336 (N.D. Ga. 1971), af'd, 468 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd
on other grounds en bane, 472 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
135. See, e g., Rios v. Steainfitters Local 638, 4 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 7792. In
Rios, the court ordered the parties to calculate the "projected output against the probable
cost" of using a computer to analyze union records. When the output appeared highly
useful and the indicated cost was reasonable, the court ordered the data compiled. See
also Struthers Scientific & Int'l Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 45 F.R.D. 375 (S.D. Tex.
1968); Greene v. Raymond, 41 F.R.D. 11, 14 (D. Colo. 1966).
136. 53 F.R.D. 330, 336 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 468 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd
on other grounds en bane, 472 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
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cating, among other things, their race, sex, date of hire, job classifica-
tion, promotions, and salary. In Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 37 the
court refused to enforce an EEOC demand for substantially the same
data.3 s The distinction between the two cases probably lies in the fact
that the Kessler court did "not envision any extreme burden upon [the
employer] in the preparation of the list demanded,"' while the Joslin
court found that "the information demanded could not be compiled
without the expenditure of a substantial amount of money by [the
employer]."140
Other courts have taken the position that relevant data must be
produced regardless of cost; but when production costs outweigh proba-
tive value, costs may be allocated or the subpoena may be modified. In
New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Brown,'4 ' for example, the Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court's oider quashing an EEOC subpoena.
The court held that relevant documents could not be withheld "merely
because full and complete compliance was arguably troublesome and
expensive to the employer.' 142  The court recognized that the subpoena
137. 336 F. Supp. 941 (D. Colo. 1971), modified on other grounds, 483 F.2d 178
(10th Cir. 1973).
138. The court apparently believed that anything other than the mere handing over
of existing documents and records constituted "compilation" and could not be compelled.
The court noted that "there is no way that the statute can be read to require an employer
to compile information. See. 2000e-8 gives the right to copy, and Sec. 2000e-9 requires
the production of documentary evidence. No statute requires the employer to compile
anything, and the courts have so held." 336 F. Supp. at 947 (citations omitted). Contra,
Sheet Metal Workers Local 104 v. EEOC, 439 F.2d 237, 243 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding
that there is nothing "unique about an order to compile lists").
139. 53 F.R.D. at 337.
140. 336 F. Supp. at 945.
141. 507 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1975).
142. Id. at 164-65; accord, Circle K Corp. v. EEOC, 501 F.2d 1052, 1055 (10th
Cir. 1974); Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1973); EEOC v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 11 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,935, at 7954 (D. Md.
May 4, 1976). See also Cameron Iron Works, Inc. v. EEOC, 320 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D.
Tex. 1970). In Cameron, the court found that "the preparation of the two promotion
lists . . . will require expenditure of a significant number of man-hours," but held that
"the company cannot prevent disclosure merely by demonstrating the inconvenience of
compliance." Id. at 1194. But see See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967)
(fourth amendment requires that administrative subpoenas be "sufficiently limited in
scope . . . so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome"); CCH EEOC
COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 26.1(e)(5) (1976) ("burdensomeness is a valid defense" to a
request for evidence.) Under 29 U.S.C. § 161 (Supp. V, 1975), which now governs the
conduct of EEOC investigations, the NLRB has had little difficulty in obtaining
enforcement of its demands for lists of employees with addresses and pertinent employ-
ment information. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery Div., 384 F.2d 188, 191 (4th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 950 (1968); NLRB v. Costello, 296 F. Supp. 1035 (D.
Conn. 1968).
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required substantial compilation of data but ruled that this fact alone
was not a ground for quashing the entire subpoena.'48 The court
ordered the trial judge to apply the standards of Rule 45(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to modify the subpoena or to provide
for the payment of costs of production to the respondent.144
By its terms, Rule 45 sanctions only a subpoena that requires a
witness to produce designated and existing documents; it does not
authorize a subpoena requiring compilation of data.14 5 Nevertheless, a
number of courts have interpreted the rule as requiring such compila-
tions when they do not impose a great burden on the employer or when
the party serving the subpoena assumes the cost of compilation. 46
Where the difficulty and cost of compiling the data are substantially less
for one of the the parties-usually the employer, due to his familiarity
143. 507 F.2d at 164-65. The terms of the subpoena, which were extremely
burdensome, are set forth in an appendix to the district court's opinion. 369 F. Supp.
702, 713-14 (E.D. La. 1974).
144. 507 F.2d at 165. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(b) provides: "[tihe court, upon motion
made promptly and in any event at or before the time specified in the subpoena for
compliance therewith, may (1) quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable and
oppressive or (2) condition denial of the motion upon the advancement by the person in
whose behalf the subpoena is issued of the reasonable cost of producing the books,
papers, documents, or tangible things." The Fifth Circuit did not seek to apply Rule 45
itself, but only the standards developed under the rule. The Rule "does not apply to the
enforcement of subpoenas issued by administrative officers and commissions pursuant to
statutory authority." 5A J. MooRE, FEDEtAL PRACTCE 45.01[2] (2d ed. 1975). A
subpoena duces tecum cannot be issued under Rule 45 in the absence of pending
litigation. See generally Sullivan v. Dickson, 283 F.2d 725, 727 (9th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 984 (1965).
145. 5A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 45.0511], at 45-35 (2d ed. 1975). Nor
can such compilation be required under FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (production of documents).
Berg v. Hoppe, 352 F.2d 776, 779 (9th Cir. 1965); Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC,
336 F. Supp. 941, 947 (D. Colo. 1971), modified on other grounds, 483 F.2d 178 (10th
Cir. 1973). See also NLRB v. Consolidated Vacuum Corp., 395 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1968). In Consolidated Vaccum the court required an employer to produce documents
and records reflecting wage increases over a two year period but did not require
compilation of the data by the employer. Under FFa. R. Civ. P. 33(c), a party served
with an interrogatory requiring compilations from business records has the option of
specifying the records containing the desired data and allowing the adverse party access
to those records for the purpose of compiling the information himself.
146. See, e.g. Miller v. Sun Chem. Corp., 12 F.R.D. 181, 183 (D.N.J. 1952); State
Theatre Co. v. Tri-States Theatre Corp., 11 F.R.D. 381, 384 (D. Neb. 1951); Ulrich v.
Ethyl Gasoline Corp., 2 F.R.D. 357, 359-60 (W.D. Ky. 1942). Comparable allocations
of burden and cost must be made during litigation. See Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 62
F.R.D. 98, 103 (W.D. Ky. 1973), modified, 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975) (successful
plaintiff recovers cost of copying defendant's employment applications); Blank v. Talley
Indus., Inc., 54 F.R.D. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Adams v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 54 F.R.D.
220, 222 (W.D. Va. 1972) (under Rule 34, defendant in Title VII case required to
produce payroll lists; plaintiff required to assume cost).
with the records-that party should bear the initial cost. If the expense
and burden are relatively the same for both parties, they should be borne
by the party seeking the information. 14 7 In either event, if the charge
becomes a lawsuit, these expenses, together with other discovery expens-
es, should be considered by the trial court in exercising its discretion to
award costs to the prevailing party. 1
48
Uses of Statistics
It is now well settled that a Title VII plaintiff can establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by offering statistical proof that the employ-
er has a disproportionate number of minority employees in his work
force or in the relevant job classification as compared with the general
population or the civilian labor force. 49 Likewise, statistics play a
significant role during the investigation of a charge under Title VII,
because they indicate the broad impact of a particular employment
practice on a group of employees more clearly and more reliably than do
interviews, employer policy statements, or the complaints of individual
employees. 50 The defensive employer must be prepared to clarify or
counteract unfavorable statistics, to supplement or modify requests from
the EEOC for statistical data, and to prepare and submit unrequested
statistics supportive of his position.
One of the basic statistical comparisons likely to be made by the
EEOC investigator will be between the minority utilization in the em-
147. See 5A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE V 45.05[l], at 45-35 to -36 (2d ed.
1975). See the business records option of FED. R. CIv. P. 33(c): the option of
producing the records containing the data sought, instead of an abstract, is available only
when "the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is substantially the same for the
party serving the interrogatory as for the party served .... ." See Burns v. Thiokol
Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1973); Monsanto Co. v. EEOC, 2 CCH
Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,098 (N.D. Fla. 1969).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(k) (1970); see Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d
543, 550 (4th Cir. 1975). See cases cited at note 146 supra.
149. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973);
Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 527 (6th Cir. 1976); Muller v. United
States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 928 (10th Cir. 1975). See also Dorsaneo, Statistical
Evidence in Employment Discrimination Litigation: Selection of the Available Popula-
tion, Problems, and Proposals, 29 Sw. L.J. 859 (1975); Note, Employment Discrimina-
tion: Statistics and Preferences under Title VII, 59 VA. L. REv. 463 (1973). Where the
prima facie statistical case is unrebutted, judgment will likely be entered for the plaintiff.
See Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 12 CCH EMPL. PRAc. DEC. 11,260 (7th Cir.
Oct. 4, 1976).
150. The employer's good faith or honest intentions are irrelevant, of course, if his
practices have an adverse impact on a protected minority group. Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 355-56 (5th
Cir. 1972).
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ployer's work force and the minority population in the state or county or
in the civilian labor force. The civilian data chosen for comparison may
well control the outcome of the charge. In one recent case,' 5 ' for
example, the employer's plant was located in a city with a Black
population of 51 percent. The Black population of the greater metro-
politan area, however, was only 22 percent. The court noted that com-
paring the employer's work force, which was 16 percent Black, to the
population of the greater metropolitan area and to the population of the
city itself, would produce "widely differing conclusions."'1 52
Statistical analyses of the employer's work force have "little
probative value without statistical background data concerning the
eligible . . . labor pool from which [minority employees] would have
been drawn."'5 3  The "eligible labor pool" should only include those
qualified for the jobs in question. 154  Relevant background data is
generally available from government agencies such as the Census Bu-
reau, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, or a state's labor or employment
department. The employer would be wise not to save for the court his
arguments regarding the appropriate civilian population to be compared
with his labor force. Rather, he should make these arguments to the
EEOC during the investigative stage, in the hopes of obtaining early
agreement on this issue.
As a general rule, the employer should not blindly supply statistical
data to the EEOC but should explain unfavorable data and supplement
misleading information. The EEOC often requests data comparing the
number of minority employees hired with the total number of appli-
cants. If such statistics are underrepresentative of the employer's actual
minority utilization, he might be justified in protesting that reliance on
job applications is misleading because, for example, duplications are
numerous, job inquiries often come in and are rejected by phone, and
151. Hester v. Southern Ry., 497 F.2d 1374, 1379 n.6 (5th Cir. 1974); cf. League
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873, 896-97 (C.D. Cal.
1976).
152. 497 F.2d at 1379 n.6.
153. Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Serv., 520 F.2d 420, 428
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976); accord, Robinson v.
Union Carbide Corp., 12 CCH EMPL. PRAc. DEC. 11,179, at 5247-28 (5th Cir. Sept.
10, 1976).
154. See Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 620-
21 (1974); James v. Wallace, 12 CCH EMPL. PRAC. DEC. 11,001, at 4718-18 (5th Cir.
June 21, 1976); Kaplan v. International Alliance of Theatrical Employees, 525 F.2d
1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1975). But see Spu&Iock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216,
218 (10th Cir. 1972) (statistics limited to "qualified" applicants not acceptable where
qualifications themselves alleged to be discriminatory).
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many applications are filed by unqualified persons responding to affirm-
ative action recruiting. 155 If the EEOC asks for a breakdown of all
minority employees in a particular job category, the employer should
consider whether a combination of two or more classifications, depart-
ments, or facilities would be more appropriate. Often, jobs with differ-
ent titles are similar enough in content to be considered equivalent for
such statistical purposes. On the other hand, the EEOC may require
company-wide data and the employer may prefer to submit more limited
statistics restricted, for example, to one department or facility. The
most influential factors in deciding the appropriate scope of statistical
samples within the company are the similarity of jobs, the mobility and
interchangeability of employees, the centralization of labor relations,
and the similarity of employment practices in different facilities or
departments. 156 If the statistical sample requested by the investigator
involves only a small number of employees, the employer may have the
right to object to such evidence as irrelevant or not probative. It has
been held that "statistical evidence derived from an extremely small
universe .. .has little predictive value and must be disregarded."'157
The employer often must be creative in supplying, clarifying, or
supplementing statistics. For example, an employer confronted with
the fact that only 5 percent of his work force is Black might be able to
argue that the percentage would be a more favorable 20 percent if the
EEOC did not include in its sampling employees hired before the Civil
Rights Act became effective in July 1965.158 Additionally, the employ-
er might be able to show that there was a larger percentage of Black
155. Such an argument was successful in Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., 538
F.2d 652, 657-58 (5th Cir. 1976). The plaintiff had established that Blacks, on the
average, filed 50% of the applications and obtained 26% of the jobs. When the court
ruled that the application evidence was unreliable, it accepted the employer's argument
that nondiscrimination was shown by the fact that, over the past four years, 33% of the
new hires had been Black although the plant operated in an area where only 25% of the
population was Black.
156. See Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 483 F.2d 178, 184 (10th Cir. 1973);
Parliament House Motor Hotel v. EEOC, 444 F.2d 1335, 1340 (5th Cir. 1971); Union
Bank v. EEOC. 296 F. Supp. 313, 314 (C.D. Cal. 1967), affd, 408 F.2d 867 (9th Cir.
1968).
157. Harper v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409, 412 (8th Cir. 1975) (five
persons); accord, Morita v. Southern Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 12 CCH EMPL. PRAC.
DEC. 11,161, at 5350 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 1976) (eight persons); Robinson v. City of
Dallas, 514 F.2d 1271, 1273 (5th Cir. 1975) (seven persons); Keely v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 404 F. Supp. 573, 579 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (thirty-four persons). But see
Chicano Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 526 F.2d 431, 439 (10th Cir. 1975), vacated and
remanded, 96 S. Ct. 3161 (1976).
158. See Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 275 (4th Cir. 1976).
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applicants hired in the previous year than any other ethnic or racial
group, 1' 9 or, on the other hand, that few qualified Blacks applied for
the jobs in question or resided in the appropriate recruiting area. The
employer's claim that no qualified minority applicants are available,
however, will carry little weight if the job qualifications themselves are
challenged as discriminatory. 6"
The EEOC is particularly impressed by favorable trends in em-
ployment patterns. A steady annual increase in minority utilization is
much more persuasive to the commission than a semiannual or annual
aberration in employment statistics. Thus, although the employer's
utilization of Blacks in a given geographical area ought to be 20 percent,
the fact that it is only 15 percent is less likely to be viewed unfavorably
if that figure has increased from 10 percent the previous year and 5
percent the year before that. Likewise, an employer faced with the fact
that less than a third of his management employees are women may be
able to demonstrate that, in the preceding two years, women obtained
more than half of the promotions into entry level management positions,
which would result in a more balanced distribution in the near future.
The Problem of "Relevance"
Section 709(a) of the act provides that the EEOC investigator
shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the purposes of
examination, and the right to copy any evidence of any person
being investigated or proceeded against that relates to unlawful
employment practices covered by this subchapter and is relevant
to the charge under investigation.-6'
The phrase "relevant to the charge under investigation" has been the
subject of substantial litigation and interpretation, particularly since
Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc.' 62 and its progeny 63 established the
principle that a lawsuit under Title VII could encompass all areas of
discrimination uncovered during the EEOC investigation of a charge.
On the whole, employer efforts to narrow the construction of section
709(a) have been unsuccessful. While lip service has been paid to the
well established doctrine prohibiting administrative "fishing expedi-
tions," 64 courts have been reluctant to restrict the commission's inquiry
159. See Ochoa v. Monsanto Co., 335 F. Supp. 53, 56, 59 (S.D. Tex. 1971), afl'd,
473 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1973).
160. Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 218 (10th Cir. 1972).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
162. 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970).
163. See notes 82-87 & accompanying text supra.
164. E.g., EEOC v. University of N.M., 504 F.2d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1974);
and have generally allowed access to any evidence which appears even
remotely relevant to the charge. More than one court has held that a
single charge of employment discrimination is a sufficient basis for a
"full-scale inquiry into the alleged unlawful motivation in employment
practices."165
As a result, the relationship between the charge itself and the scope
of the EEOC's investigation appears to have diminished. To many
courts the charge has become merely a "jurisdictional springboard" for
the commission.' 66 Thus, a complaint to the EEOC alleging a discrimi-
natory discharge has been said to justify inquiry into the employer's
hiring practices, 67 his customer relations, 168 and his transfer and pro-
Parliament House Motor Hotel v. EEOC, 444 F.2d 1335, 1339 (5th Cir. 1971). See
also United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652-53 (1950); FTC v. American
Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1924).
165. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 1970);
accord, EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1976); Motorola, Inc.
v. McLain, 484 F.2d 1339, 1346 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974);
Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355, 358 (6th Cir. 1969); Jenkins v. United
Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33 (5th Cir. 1968). Contra, United States Steel Corp. v.
EEOC, 6 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 8980, at 6169 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 6 CCH Empl. Prac.
Dec. 8981 (3d Cir. 1973).
166. EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1976); EEOC v.
Huttig Sash & Door Co., 511 F.2d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1975).
167. Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 483 F.2d 178, 184 (10th Cir. 1973).
168. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972). See also EEOC Dec. No. 74-84, 2 CCH Empl. Prac. Guide % 6450 (1975). The
Rogers decision is hardly persuasive authority. The court's opinion was written by one
judge, another concurred in the result for different reasons, and a third dissented. The
court held that evidence of patient segregation in a medical facility was relevant to a
determination of whether employees were discriminated against because such segregation
"could be so employee demeaning as to constitute an invidious condition of employ-
ment." 454 F.2d at 240. The probative value of such evidence is highly questionable.
The EEOC and the courts have on occasion held that an employer violates Title VII by
suffering the existence of a work environment in which minorities are subjected to
harassment. See, e.g., Gray v. Greyhound Lines, 12 CCH EMPL. PRAC. DEC. % 11,211,
at 5582 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 13, 1976); Johnson v. Lillie Rubin Affiliates, Inc., 5 CCH Empl.
Prac. Dec. 8542 (M.D. Tenn. 1972); EEOC Dec. No. 72-1561, CCH EEOC Dec. %
6354 (1973); EEOC Dec. No. 72-0621, CCH EEOC Dec. 6311 (1971); EEOC Dec.
No. 71-2598, CCH EEOC Dec. % 6284 (1971). However, other courts have refused to
find violations where the employee's own social sensitivity, rather than the employer's
discrimination, was the basis for the injury. See, e.g., Howard v. National Cash Register
Co., 9 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,177, at 7806 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Fekete v. United
States Steel Corp., 5 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec 8569, at 7679 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
Minorities, of course, have not been given statutory immunity from prejudice, either
directed at them or committed in their presence. But see Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 12
CCIH EMPL. PRAc. DEC. % 11,238 (9th Cir. 1976) (Caucasian has standing to challenge
employer for maintaining work environment in which racial and ethnic minorities are
discriminated against). It is further submitted that Title VII does not eliminate an
employer's personal right to be prejudiced or to discriminate in his business or private
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motion policies. 169 Similarly, the investigation of a charge against a
multi-store or multi-department employer has often been expanded
beyond the facility in which the charging party worked to cover all of
the employer's stores or departments.Y0 The investigative net has
frequently been thrown over an entire category of evidence without
judicial direction that irrelevant material, which may include personal
and confidential data, be deleted. In one case, for example, the court
ordered compliance with an EEOC subpoena that required production
of the complete personnel files of all employees over a three year period,
despite the employer's objection that the files contained much irrelevant
personal data.Y17  The better approach would have been for the court to
review, in camera, those portions of the files deemed irrelevant by the
employer.
The most recent and perhaps the ultimate expansion of the concept
of relevance occurred in EEOC v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co.172  In that case, the court held that the scope of the EEOC's
investigation may encompass any discrimination which could have been
alleged by the charging party, regardless of what actually was alleged.
The court based its ruling on the employee's presumed inability "to
make a legal conclusion as to the bases upon which she is being
life as long as he does not act in ways which limit the employment opportunities of
persons protected by the act. Similarly, under the NLRA, an employer has the right to
be overtly prejudiced against unions as long as he dces not discriminate against employees
on the basis of their union activities. See NLRB v. Ogle P.otection Serv., Inc., 375 F.2d
497, 505 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886, 896-97
(5th Cir. 1962).
169. Veazie v. Southern Greyhound Lines, 374 F. Supp. 811, 815 (E.D. La. 1974).
For two months in 1972, the Fifth Circuit followed a restrictive rule with respect to the
scope of the EEOC investigation. In a case heard during that period, the court held that
the EEOC's investigation of a charge alleging a discriminatory refusal to hire was limited
to the employer's hiring practices. Tedford v. Airco Reduction, Inc., 4 CCH Empl.
Prac. Dec. 7654 (5th Cir. 1972). Sixty-four days later, the court vacated the opinion
as "based upon incomplete argumentation." 4 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. % 7776.
170. Parliament House Motor Hotel v. EEOC, 444 F.2d 1335, 1340 (5th Cir.
1971); Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32, 42 (4th Cir. 1971); Blue Bell Boots, Inc.
v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355, 358 (6th Cir. 1969). Some courts have reached a contrary
result where the employer's facilities were independently managed and the employer's
labor relations policies were not centrally controlled. See, e.g., Joslin Dry Goods Co. v.
EEOC, 483 F.2d 178, 184 (10th Cir. 1973); United States Steel Corp. v. EEOC, 6 CCH
Empl. Prac. Dec 8980, at 6169 (W.D. Pa.), alf'd, 6 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 8981
(3d Cir. 1973); Union Bank v. EEOC, 296 F. Supp. 313, 314 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd,
408 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1968).
171. EEOC v. University of N.M., 504 F.2d 1296, 1302-04 (10th Cir. 1974); see
Comment, 1975 UTAH L. REv. 264, 275.
172. 11 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,935 (D. Md. May 4, 1976).
discriminated against.' 1 73  Accordingly, the court granted enforcement
of commission subpoenas seeking information as to respondent's em-
ployees identified by sex even though the two charges being investigated
specifically alleged only racial discrimination.' 7 4
The court's holding in United States Fidelity is a significant expan-
sion of the leading case in this area, Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc.171
In Sanchez, the Fifth Circuit held:
[T]he crucial element of a charge of discrimination is the factual
statement contained therein. Everything else entered on the form
is, in essence, a mere amplification of the factual allegations. The
selection of the type of discrimination alleged, i.e., the selection
of which box to check, is in reality nothing more than the attach-
ment of a legal conclusion to the facts alleged. In the context of
a statute like Title VII it is inconceivable that a charging party's
rights should be cut off merely because he fails to articulate correctly
the legal conclusions emanating from his factual allegations. 176
Accordingly, the Sanchez court held that the plaintiff's claim of discrim-
ination based on national origin had been timely as an amendment to
her original charge of sex discrimination, because the facts set forth in
the first charge were sufficient to warrant an investigation of discrimina-
tion based on national origin.
It is reasonable to construe Sanchez as establishing the principle
that the EEOC has the right to investigate unalleged violations indicated
by the facts stated in the charge.' 7 7 Such a concept does not, however,
support the holding of the court in United States Fidelity that the EEOC
may actively seek out evidence of all unalleged violations which the
complainant would have standing to raise, regardless of the facts alleged
173. Id. at 7957. As a practical matter, persons wishing to file discrimination
charges are generally assisted by agency personnel when they draft the charge. See
CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 2.2 (1976).
174. With respect to two other charges, however, the court refused to compel
production of evidence relating to national origin because the complainants did not
belong to a distinct ethnic group. The court also refused to enforce a subpoena seeking
racial evidence where the complainant was Caucasian "and could not complain of
discrimination on the basis of race." 11 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 7960. Contra,
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976).
175. 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970).
176. Id. at 462.
177. Although Sanchez held that a Title VII lawsuit may be as broad as the scope
of the EEOC investigation, a small minority of courts have held that a lawsuit cannot be
based on a category of discrimination (e.g., race or sex) different from that alleged in
the charge filed with the EEOC. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp., Inc., 522
F.2d 1235, 1240-41 (7th Cir. 1975); Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D.
1, 8-10 (E.D. Pa. 1975); EEOC v. New York Times Broadcasting Serv., Inc., 364 F.
Supp. 651, 653-54 (W.D. Tenn. 1973).
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in the charge. 178 In that case, the court approved an EEOC investiga-
tion into possible sex discrimination even though the charge specifically
alleged only racial discrimination and contained facts negating any
reasonable likelihood of sex discrimination.19 United States Fidelity is
thus a serious digression from the Sanchez line of cases because it
contradicts the rule that the factual statement is the crucial element of a
charge and that the scope of the EEOC's investigation must be reasona-
bly related to that statement. Furthermore, if the EEOC investigation,
which normally does not begin until many months after the charge is
filed, is to encompass unalleged charges, the employer may be preju-
diced by the lack of timely notice of such charges and may have grounds
to resist a subpoena for evidence related to those charges.
Congress clearly intended to maintain some relationship between
the breadth of the charge and the scope of the EEOC investigation. This
is indicated by the fact that, in providing that the statutory regulations
governing NLRB investigations should apply to the EEOC,180 Congress
did not accept the broader concept of relevance embodied in those
regulations. Thus, the EEOC is allowed access only to evidence "rele-
vant to the charge under investigation,"'' while the NLRB has access to
any evidence "that relates to any matter under investigation or in
question.'18 2  Strangely enough, the courts have construed the NLRA
language in a more restrictive manner than they have the narrower Title
178. In two recent appellate court decisions involving the EEOC's right to maintain
a lawsuit based on claims of discrimination not raised in the initial charge but developed
during the investigation, the EEOC had not sought evidence of the unalleged violations
but had obtained it during the course of a reasonable investigation of the alleged
violations. See EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 533, 540-41 (9th Cir.
1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3101 (U.S. July 23, 1976) (No. 76-99);
EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 365-66 (4th Cir. 1976).
179. The charge filed with the EEOC read as follows: "I have been working for
the co. for 3 years, 6 months and 6 days. Since this time I have not received a
promotion. I was told when I began to work there that promotions were made on a
seniority basis. Three white girls have been promoted with less seniority than I. To my
knowledge I have never been evaluated by my supervisor, and my work has been as good
or better than any of my co-workers. I believe that the failure of my employer to
promote me is based on my race (Black). There are only 5 Blacks out of approximately
130 employees." 11. CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. at 7955 (emphasis added). Contra EEOC
v. Cambridge Tile Mfg. Co., 13 CCH EMPL. PRAc. DEc. 11,288, at 5955 (S.D. Ohio
Dec. 13, 1976).
180. 42 U.S.C. f 2000e-9 (Supp. V, 1975); see 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1970).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1970).
182. 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1970). A proposal that the NLRA language be
incorporated into Title VII was considered and rejected by Congress. Graniteville Co. v.
EEOC, 438 F.2d 32, 39-41 (4th Cir. 1971).
VII provision. For example, in NLRB v. Fant Milling Co.,8 3 the
Supreme Court held that an NLRB investigation could not be confined
"to the precise particularizations of a charge"' 8 but that the board does
not have "carte blanche to expand the charge as they might please, or to
ignore it altogether."' 89  The investigation could deal only with those
unfair labor practices "which are related to those alleged in the charge
and which grow out of them ... ."186 Subsequent decisions have
interpreted Fant Milling to require that when the board issues a com-
plaint encompassing allegations not made in the original charge, the new
allegations must be "of the same general nature as that asserted in the
charge"'1 7 or "closely related" to the events complained of in the charge
and "of the same class" as those events.' 88 The EEOC, whose investiga-
tory powers are limited by statute to the scope of the charge, should be
given no greater latitude in conducting its investigations.
The Determination
Following its investigation, the EEOC issues a determination
whether there is reasonable cause to credit the allegations of the charge.
The EEOC is supposed to "make its determination on reasonable cause
as promptly as possible and, so far as practicable, not later than one
hundred and twenty days from the filing of the charge ... ."189 The
commission's backlog, however, has generally prevented compliance
with this provision, and the courts have not enforced a literal reading. 190
The issuance of a reasonable cause determination is a condition prece-
dent to a suit filed by the EEOC'9 ' but not to an action brought by an
individual.192
183. 360 U.S. 301 (1959).
184. Id. at 308-09.
185. Id. at 309.
186. Id. See also National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U S. 350, 369 (1940).
187. NLRB v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 486 F.2d 743, 746 (7th Cir.
1973).
188. NLRB v. Operating Engr's Local 925, 460 F.2d 589, 596 (5th Cir. 1972).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
190. See, e.g., Steck-Vaughn Co. v. EEOC, 8 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 9796, at
6333 (W.D. Tex. 1974). Even if the commission's untimely issuance of a reasonable
cause determination resulted from mere error or neglect rather than administrative
overload, an employer could not obtain dismissal of a subsequent lawsuit on such
grounds except in the unlikely event that he had been prejudiced by the delay. See
generally EEOC v. Laclede Gas Co., 530 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Hearst
Corp., 10 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. % 10,246 (W.D. Wash 1974) (defense of laches not
maintainable in absence of unreasonable delay and prejudice).
191. EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 273 F. Supp. 985, 991-93 (D. Md. 1974).
192. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973); Jefferson v.
Peerless Pumps Hydrodynamics, 456 F.2d 1359, 1361 (9th Cir. 1972).
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Reasonable cause findings are typically rendered by the district
directors,193 even though the statute gives the commission that responsi-
bility. 194  This delegation of authority has been held proper.195 Re-
quests for reconsideration of reasonable cause determinations will not be
granted, but the commission or the district directors may, sua sponte,
reconsider such findings at any time. 9 6 The commission's regulations
used to provide that it would notify the interested parties prior to
reconsidering a reasonable cause determination, and the commission
was severely criticized when it failed to issue such notices.' 97 In re-
sponse to the criticism, the EEOC amended its regulations to require
notification only after the actual decision on reconsideration had been
rendered.' 98 Thus, there is still no administrative appeal from a deter-
mination of reasonable cause, and the courts have refused to review the
factual basis for such a determination.'99
Section 706(b) of Title VIF ° requires the EEOC, when making
its reasonable cause decision, to "accord substantial weight to final
findings and orders made by state or local authorities" which have
investigated the charging party's claims. The EEOC has diluted the
strength of this provision considerably. Its procedural rules define
"final findings and orders" to include only those rendered after a public
hearing and served by local agencies upon the EEOC.21' "Substantial
weight" is defined to mean "such full and careful consideration. . . as
is appropriate in light of the facts supporting [the findings]"20 2  In
addition, the following prerequisites must be satisfied:
(i) The proceedings were fair and regular; and
(ii) The remedies and relief granted are comparable in scope to
the remedies and relief required by Federal law; and
(iii) The final findings and order serve the interest of the effective
enforcement of Title VII. 20 3
193. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19b(b), (d) (1975).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
195. EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 530 F.2d 590, 594 (4th Cir. 1976); cf.
EEOC v. Otto, 12 CCH EMPL. PRAc. Dc. 111,154 (D. Md. Feb 20, 1976).
196, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19b(b), (d) (1975).
197. Veazie v. Southern Greyhound Lines, 374 F. Supp. 811, 813-14 (E.D. La.
1974).
198, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19b(b), (d) (1975). The regulation was amended three
months after the Veazie decision.
199. See EEOC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 373 F. Supp. 1321, 1338 (D.
Del. 1974); EEOC v. Eagle Iron Works, 8 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. % 9541, at 5355 (S.D.
Iowa 1974).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
201. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19b(e) (1975).
202. Id.
203. Id.
Finally, the EEOC rules provide that substantial weight will not be
given to the state agency's conclusions of law.204
Given the manner in which the EEOC construes the statutory
requirement that it accord substantial weight to state findings, it is no
surprise that the commission often renders reasonable cause determina-
tions which are contrary to those issued by state agencies. In such
cases, the federal courts have not required the commission to explain its
reasons for reaching contrary results or to specify the manner and extent
to which it accorded substantial weight to the state findings.2 05 The
"substantial weight" provision is thus devoid of value owing to lack of
enforcement. In view of the burden on the employer of requiring him
to respond to the often duplicative investigations of state and federal
commissions, the EEOC should be required to offer some explanation
when it arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the state
agency on the same set of facts. This would protect the employer
against overzealous investigators who disregard state proceedings entire-
ly. Furthermore, the state agency might benefit from the EEOC's
expertise if it learned the ratio decidendi of the EEOC's contrary
conclusion.
The commission encourages its staff members (1) to draft reason-
able cause findings which are likely to persuade the employer that a
violation of Title VII has occurred, and (2) to resist the impulse "to
torture a 'cause' decision" out of facts which may indicate unfair treat-
ment, but not Title VII discrimination. 2 6  The employer who is decid-
ing whether to attempt conciliation with the commission should review
the reasonable cause determination carefully, since the findings and
conclusions contained therein will circumscribe the scope of the EEOC's
conciliation efforts.20 7 If concilation is unsuccessful, the determination
will influence the EEOC attorneys in deciding whether or not a lawsuit
is warranted. Furthermore, even though the commission does not
accept motions for reconsideration of reasonable cause determinations, a
request for clarification might be granted if the determination is impre-
cise. Neither the EEOC nor the employer can make a good faith effort
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., United States v. Sweet Home Cent. School Dist., 407 F. Supp. 1362,
1365-66 (W.D.N.Y. 1976).
206. See CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL §§ 125.2, .3 (1976).
207. EEOC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 373 F. Supp. 1321, 1336 (D. Del.
1974). The reasonable cause determination will also circumscribe the scope of the
eventual lawsuit. EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 366 (4!h Cir. 1976);
EEOC v. American Mach. & Foundry, Inc., 12 CCH EMPL. PRAC. DEC. 11,200 at 5528
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1976).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 28
March 1977] TITLE VII EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CHARGES 915
at conciliation unless both parties agree on the scope of the discrimina-
tory practice which they are trying to eliminate.
The Conciliation Effort
Good Faith Requirement
Once the commission determines that there is reasonable cause to
believe the allegations of the charge are true, it must "endeavor to
eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." 208  The fruit of
these endeavors will be a written conciliation agreement enforceable in
federal court as a contract. 209 For the process to be completely success-
ful, of course, the conciliation agreement must be executed by all parties
concerned. A settlement between the employer and the EEOC does not
bar a suit by the charging party,210 and a settlement between the
charging party and the employer does not bar a subsequent suit by the
EEOC. 211
Under the recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in Cox v. Allied Chemical Corp., the charging party will not be
bound by a conciliation agreement bearing his signature if he can later
establish that he did not fully comprehend the significance of his act
when he waived his right to sue.212 After suit is filed by such an
individual, the district court must conduct a hearing to determine wheth-
er the waiver was knowing and voluntary. Assuming the Allied Chemi-
cal holding is followed in other jurisdictions, it becomes incumbent on
the employer-respondent to insure that the charging party has been fully
apprised of his rights before he signs a settlement under Title VII. The
EEOC should, of course, assume this responsibility itself, but the em-
ployer cannot rely on the agency since the courts generally refuse to
penalize individuals for EEOC errors and omissions. 21 '3 It might be
208. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V, 1975). "The commission's statutory duty
to attempt conciliation is among its most essential functions." EEOC v. Raymond Metal
Prods. Co., 530 F.2d 590, 596 (4th Cir. 1976).
209. See EEOC v. Mississippi Baptist Hosp., 11 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 110,822, at
7449 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 29, 1976).
210. Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289, 291 (7th Cir. 1969); see 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. V, 1975).
211. EEOC v. McLean Trucking Co., 525 F.2d 1007, 1010 (6th Cir. 1975).
212. Cox v. Allied Chem. Corp., 538 F.2d 1094, 1097-98 (5th Cir. 1976). See also
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974).
213. See, e.g., DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 520 F.2d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 1975);
Ramos v. Port Authority, 12 CCH EMPL PRAc. DEc. 1 11,035, at 4814 (S.D.N.Y. June
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advisable for the parties to include a clause in the settlement agreement
which states that the charging party has been fully informed of his rights
under Title VII, including the right to file suit on his own behalf. The
provision should indicate that the employee signs the agreement with the
knowledge and understanding that by so doing he waives all rights to
challenge further the respondent's alleged discriminatory employment
practices and their effects upon him.
Fulfillment of the EEOC's statutory responsibility for attempting
conciliation is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a lawsuit by that agency, 214
and only those issues which have been subject to the conciliation process
may be raised in the EEOC suit. 15 The act requires the EEOC to
make a genuine good faith effort at conciliation.216 In this author's
experience, however, employers frequently receive, on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis, burdensome conciliation proposals which include substan-
tial back pay, reporting, and affirmative action requirements. In such
cases, the EEOC representative may simply ignore the employer's objec-
tions to his proposed conciliation agreement and treat the case as ripe
for litigation.2 17
23, 1976); Padilla v. Stringer, 395 F. Supp. 495, 497-98 (D.N.M. 1974); Healen v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 9 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,023, at 7237 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
214. The act provides that the EEOC can institute a lawsuit only when it "has been
unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the
commission." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V, 1975). If the commission has not
made a genuine effort to secure such an agreement, it cannot establish that it has been
unable to fulfill the requirement. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc.,
517 F.2d 826, 869 (5th Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Hickey-Mitchell Co., 507 F.2d 944, 947-48
(8th Cir. 1974); EEOC v. Canadian Indem. Co., 407 F. Supp. 1366, 1367 (C.D. Cal.
1976). The same requirement is applicable to a "pattern or practice" action brought by
the EEOC under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (Supp. V, 1975). EEOC v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 10 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,271, at 5136 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
The EEOC's failure to attempt conciliation is not, however, a bar to a suit brought by
the charging party. Gamble v. Birmingham S.R.R., 514 F.2d 678, 688 (5th Cir. 1975);
Jefferson v. Peerless Pumps Hydrodynamic Div., 456 F.2d 1359, 1361 (9th Cir. 1972);
Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 405 F.2d 645, 652 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 918 (1969).
215 See EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 1976); Jiron
v. Sperry Rand Corp., 9 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. T 9990, at 7126 (D. Utah 1975);
Belcher v. Bassett Furn. Indus., Inc., 376 F. Supp. 593, 596-98 (W.D. Va. 1974).
216. EEOC v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 7 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. V 9245, at 7164 (E.D.
Mo. 1973); EEOC v. Guaranty Say. & Loan Ass'n, 369 F. Supp. 36, 38 (N.D. Ala.
1973); EEOC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 366 F. Supp. 273, 275 (D. Md. 1973).
217. One court, recognizing that failure of conciliation is a prerequisite to an
EEOC lawsuit, recently held that an employer who had suggested amendments to the
EEOC's conciliation proposal had precluded formation of an agreement by failing to
"unequivocally and totally" accept the commission's draft. EEOC v. Canadian Indem.
Co., 407 F. Supp. 1366, 1367 (C.D. Cal. 1976). Such an unrealistic approach to the
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A number of courts have held that they lacked authority to inquire
into the extent of the EEOC's efforts at conciliation and were limited to
a finding as to the existence of such efforts.21 8 These courts have
expressed apprehension that a judicial inquiry into the conciliation
process would have a "chilling effect" on settlement negotiations.219
This fear does not appear well-founded. Courts have been able to
examine the good faith of negotiators under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act 220 and under the Railway Labor Act2l ' without placing a chill
on the ability of the parties to deal with one another. Deference should
be paid to the settlement efforts of the EEOC because it is a federal
agency, but that does not foreclose judicial review of its actions s. 2 2 Since
settlement process is contrary to the intended purpose of the act and ignores the statutory
requirement that the EEOC be "unable to secure" a conciliation agreement. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. V, 1975). The suit was obviously premature because the parties
had not completed their settlement efforts. Indeed, the court stayed proceedings for
sixty days to enable the parties to continue to seek a settlement. 407 F. Supp. at 1368.
The suit should have been dismissed without prejudice on jurisdictional grounds.
218. E.g., EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 97, 102 (W.D. Pa. 1976);
EEOC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 8 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 9793, at 6312
(W.D. Ky. 1974); EEOC v. Container Corp., 352 F. Supp. 262, 266 (M.D. Fla. 1972);
see EEOC v. Rexall Drug Co., 9 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 9936 (E.D. Mo. 1974), in
which the court, faced with a conciliation effort consisting of one telephone call,
declared that it was "not disposed at this time to measure the extent of the Commission's
conciliation efforts where some attempt at conciliation is in evidence." Id. at 6930. A
bare allegation by the EEOC that all procedural prerequisites to institution of a lawsuit,
including attempts at conciliation, have been satisfied is sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss. See, e.g., EEOC v. Times-Picayune Pub. Corp., 500 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); EEOC v. Wah Chang Albany Corp., 499 F.2d 187,
189 (9th Cir. 1974); EEOC v. Lutheran Hosp., 7 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 9205, at
7009 (E.D. Mo. 1974); cf. EEOC v. Otto, 12 CCH EMPL. PRC. DEC. 11,154, at 5306
nn.9 & 11 (D. Md. Feb. 20, 1976).
219. E.g., EEOC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 8 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 1
9793, at 6312 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
220. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1970 & Supp. V, 1975); see, e.g., NLRB v. Homes Tuttle
Broadway Ford, Inc., 465 F.2d 717, 718 (9th Cir. 1972).
221. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63, 181-88 (1970); see, e.g., Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United
Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 579 (1971).
222. At least two courts have made such a review. In one case the Fifth Circuit
considered the employer's claim that the EEOC had failed to conciliate in good faith and
held, without saying more, that "the charge of bad faith is simply not supported by the
record." EEOC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 505 F.2d 610, 617 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 824 (1975). In another case the district court made a finding of fact that
"plaintiff EEOC failed to conciliate the EEOC charges of [the complainants] in good
faith as required by Title VII." EEOC v. Datapoint Corp., 412 F. Supp. 406, 407 (W.D.
Tex. 1976). See also EEOC v. St. Francis Community Hosp., 11 CCH Empl. Prac.
Dec. 110,806 (D.S.C. March 3, 1976) (EEOC ordered to furnish certain documents and
to answer certain interrogatories relating to the conciliation process); EEOC v. Humko
Prods., 402 F. Supp. 1076, 1077 (W.D. Tenn. 1975) (hearing set on issue of EEOC
compliance with conciliation provisions of act).
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the EEOC's failure to attempt conciliation in good faith is a ground for
dismissal of its complaint, it would seem to follow that the courts must
assume responsibility for examining the bona fides of the commission's
efforts when they are challenged by the defendants. Indeed, judicial
review of conciliation efforts might well place added pressure on the
parties to reach a settlement.
The judicial fear of chilling conciliation efforts by exposing them to
public view apparently does not apply during the investigation phase
where the employer's cooperation and candor is equally important. In
H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC,223 the Fifth Circuit held that the charging
party is entitled to access to the EEOC's investigative files regarding his
charge, and that his attorney may review those files for the purpose of
deciding whether litigation is warranted. Although Title VII prohibits
the commission from making public any information gathered during its
investigation, the court reasoned that the charging party was not a
member of the public to whom the statute prohibits disclosure. 224  The
EEOC cannot, of course, ensure that the charging party will refrain
from disclosing the contents of the file to others.225
Publication, however limited, of the results of the commission's
investigation certainly bears a potential for "chilling" conciliation efforts
because it is likely to keep the employer from participating openly and
freely during the investigation. If the employer is aware that every
witness statement, every document, and every compilation of data may
later be turned over to the charging party for potential use in litigation
against him, he is likely to construct his responses to investigative
inquiries in a manner suitable for a judge rather than for an investigator.
As the Fifth Circuit held in Kessler, prior to its en banc reversal:
We do not agree that limiting publication of information to the
parties, as well as the general public, hinders the function or pur-
pose of the statute. Rather, these portions of the Act are intended
to insure that those directly involved in the conciliation process
can fully and in good faith participate therein, uninhibited by any
-threat that their statements and actions will be released to anyone
not otherwise privy thereto. Obviously, there are many times
223. 472 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.) (en banc, twelve to four vote), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
139 (1973).
224. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), -8(e) (Supp. V, 1975). After institution of a
lawsuit, some restrictions on disclosure are lifted. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (Supp. V,
1975); cf. Moseley v. General Motors Corp., 10 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,380
(E.D. Mo. 1975).
225. The EEOC admitted this fact to the trial court in the Kessler case. H. Kessler
& Co. v. EEOC, 53 F.R.D. 330, 340 (N.D. Ga. 1971), afj'd, 468 F.2d 25 (5th Cir.
1972), modified, 472 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
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when the charging party may be the very person to whom a com-
pany most fears any pre-suit release of information. Had [the em-
ployer] not been apprehensive that the data it made available to
the EEOC would in turn be surrendered to [the charging party]
and improperly publicized by her, it is doubtful that the present
suit would have intruded itself into the courts. And it was that
apprehension, well-founded as we view the record, which has
served to completely thwart the EEOC's nonjudicial investigative
role, and has sabotaged any hope for "informal methods of con-
ference, conciliation, and persuasion. 22
6
This statement, now mooted, is quite persuasive and consistent with the
efforts of the judiciary and of the EEOC to enhance the prospects of
voluntary compliance with Title VII.
Significantly, the EEOC does not allow the respondent access to
the investigative file until a law suit has been instituted by the charging
party.227 The EEOC disclosure policies are thus vulnerable to attack
as disruptive of conciliation efforts on two grounds: (1) disclosure to
the charging party encourages the respondent to be defensive and
uncooperative; and (2) refusal to disclose to the respondent hinders him
from making informed judgments regarding settlement.
Last Chance Notice
Under the EEOC's procedural regulations, the failure of concilia-
tion efforts is shortly followed by notification to the respondent that
settlement attempts have been terminated and will be resumed only
upon respondent's written request.228  Substantial controversy has aris-
en over whether the EEOC's failure to send this so-called "last chance"
letter is a jurisdictional bar to its subsequent lawsuit. In EEOC v.
Hickey-Mitchell Co., 229 the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an
226. 468 F.2d 25, 27 (5th Cir. 1972), modified, 472 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
227. CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 83.5 (1976).
228. "Should a respondent fail or refuse to confer with the Commission or its
representative, or fail or refuse to make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute, the
Commission may terminate its efforts to conciliate the dispute. In such event, the
respondent shall be notified promptly, in writing, that such efforts have been unsuccess-
ful and will not be resumed except upon the respondents written request within the time
specified in such notice." 28 C.F.R. § 1601.23 (1975). The commission has recently
taken the position that this regulation applies only in the absence of any legitimate
conciliation discussions between the parties. If such discussions are held without
success, only the simple notification requirement of 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25 (1976) is
applicable. EEOC v. Otto, 12 CCII EMPL. PRAc. DEC. 111,154, at 5302 (D. Md. Feb.
20, 1976). The court did not rule on that issue; rather, it held that because respondent
had rejected all conciliation overtures the full notice was required. No other court seems
to have limited section 1601.23 as the EEOC contends.
229. 507 F.2d 944 (8th Cir. 1974).
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EEOC suit for failure to issue such a letter. The court held that "even
the most uncooperative and recalcitrant respondent [has] 'the right to
be told that it has one last chance to attempt conciliation.' "230 The
commission had claimed that the notice requirement was a mere techni-
cality and that the employer had not been prejudiced by the omission.
The court held that the regulation was not merely technical and that the
EEOC had failed to prove that the employer suffered no prejudice.2"'
In three other cases, the absence of prejudice to the employer was the
decisive factor in the courts' refusal to dismiss EEOC suits based on the
commission's failure to give the last chance notice. 23 2
The last chance letter serves an important function. In many
cases, an employer's first refusal to attempt conciliation is prompted by
his distress over the reasonable cause finding. Without notice that he
can reopen negotiations, he may believe that he has burned his bridges
behind him by this initial reaction.2 3 In other cases, the employer,
thinking that he has made a conscientious effort to avoid discrimination
and unaware that such an effort is irrelevant in the face of persistent
230. Id. at 948, quoting EEOC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 366 F. Supp. 273,
276 (D. Md. 1973).
231. Id.; accord, EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 382 F. Supp. 787, 796-97 (D. Md.
1974); EEOC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 366 F. Supp. 273, 277 (D. Md. 1973).
232. In one of these cases, the Sixth Circuit found that the agency's omission was
"harmless" because the employer had rejected an offer to conciliate a companion group
of charges concerning "substantially identical issues of company practices." EEOC v.
Kimberly-Clark Co., 511 F.2d 1352, 1360 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975).
In another case, the commission had issued half the notice required by the regulation: it
had notified the employer that conciliation attempts had been terminated and that a suit
might be instituted, but it did not state that the employer's written request could reopen
discussions. EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 530 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 1976). The
Fourth Circuit there held that the employer had not been prejudiced by the EEOC's
incomplete notice, because (a) the commission's letter did not state that negotiations
were no longer possible; (b) the company was advised that a lawsuit might follow; and
(c) the company's lawyer conceded to the trial judge that the company had no desire to
engage in conciliatory discussions. Id. at 596. Similar facts were before the Eighth
Circuit and a similar result was reached in EEOC v. Laclede Gas Co., 530 F.2d 281 (8th
Cir. 1976). The distinction between the two Eighth Circuit cases, Hickey-Mitchell and
Laclede, is that in the former the EEOC sent no last chance notice at all, while in the
latter, it sent a notice which was incomplete only by reason of its failure to inform the
employer that it could reopen negotiations if it so desired. See also EEOC v. Otto, 12
CCH EMPL. PRAc. DEC. 1 11,154, at 5302-04 (D. Md. Feb. 20, 1976) (technical defect
in last chance notice not ground for dismissal if no prejudice to employer and substantial
compliance with regulation); EEOC v. Lithographers Local 2P, 10 CCH Empl. Prac.
Dec. 110,293, at 5197 (D. Md. 1975).
233. The fact that an employer initially refused to engage in a conciliation
discussion does not establish that the EEOC's subsequent failure to send the last chance
notice was nonprejudicial. EEOC v. Raymond Metals Prods. Corp., 530 F.2d 590, 596
(4th Cir. 1976).
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discrimination, 3 4 may sincerely believe that he has done all that he can.
He may, therefore, refuse to do more until actually confronted with the
threat of imminent litigation. Because of these considerations, failure
of the EEOC to comply with its last chance regulation will, in many
cases, deprive a respondent of a significant benefit. Accordingly, the
EEOC should be held to strict compliance with the regulation. More-
over, if the presence or absence of prejudice to the respondent is to be the
decisive factor in determining whether the EEOC's breach of regulation
warrants dismissal of its suit, perhaps the EEOC should bear the burden
of proving that the employer was not prejudiced by the commission's
neglect.2 35
Once the time specified in the commission's last chance letter has
expired without the respondent's seeking further conciliation discussions,
the commission notifies the charging party that settlement efforts have
failed and that he has ninety days within which to file a lawsuit.23 6 The
commission formerly sent the charging party two letters, one stating that
conciliation had been unsuccessful and a later one informing him of his
right to sue. However, the courts took divergent views on the question
of which letter commenced the statutory limitation period, 3 7 and the
EEOC abandoned the practice in favor of sending one letter.2 38
234. See Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., 538 F.2d 652, 657 (5th Cir. 1976);
Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 355-56 (5th Cir. 1972).
235. See generally EEOC v. Airguide Corp., 395 F. Supp. 600, 604 (S.D. Fla.
1975), rev'd, 539 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1976), citing Note, Violations by Agencies of
Their Own Regulations, 87 HARV. L. REV. 629, 634-35 n.25 (1974); cf. EEOC v.
American Mach. & Foundry, Inc., 12 CCH EMPL. PRAC. DEC. J[ 11,200, at 5525 (M.D.
Pa. Aug. 26, 1976) (EEOC must carry burden of justifying delay in filing suit or laches
will bar action).
236. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V, 1975). One court has held that a
private plaintiff must file his suit within the statutory period allowed by the forum state
for similar claims. If he fails to do so, his suit will be barred even though filed within
ninety days of receiving the EEOC's right-to-sue notice. Clayton v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 12 CCH EMPL. PRAC. DEC. 11,165 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 1976). This holding is
clearly erroneous because the federal statute of limitations preempts that of the state. See
Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413 F.2d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1969). If the holding was
correct, the EEOC, which often cannot even begin an investigation for many months
after receiving the charge, would be reduced to a futile role.
237. See Garner v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 538 F.2d 611, 614 (4th Cir.
1976) (numerous conflicting cases cited). Compare McGuire v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 542 F.2d 43, 45 (7th Cir. 1976) (filing period commences when plaintiff
receives right to sue letter), with Wong v. Bon Marche, 508 F.2d 1249, 1250 (9th Cir.
1975) (filing period commences with notice of right to sue), and DeMatteis v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306, 310-11 (2d Cir.), modified, 520 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1975)
(filing period commences when commission notifies parties of failure of conciliation).
238. 2 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GunEj 5318 (1975).
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Confidentiality
An employer who has been the object of an EEOC investigation
will probably wish to suppress public release of the discrimination
charges and of the evidence uncovered by the investigation in order to
avoid both damage to his business or reputation and a disadvantage with
respect to other potential complainants. The employer is more likely to
be candid and cooperative with the commission if confidentiality is
assured. Accordingly, section 706(b) of Title VII prohibits the EEOC
from publicly disclosing charges of discrimination and anything "said or
done" during the commission's "informal endeavors" to resolve com-
plaints.239 In addition, section 709(e) of the act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the Commission
to make public in any manner whatever any information obtained
by the Commission pursuant to its authority under this section
prior to the institution of any proceeding under this subchapter
involving such information.2 40
Courts have held that these statutory provisions do not bar the
charging party's access to the EEOC's investigative file on his charge.241
In addition, it has been held that a private plaintiff may obtain from the
EEOC information developed during other investigations of the employ-
er being sued which is "like or related" to the plaintiff's claims of
discrimination, as long as references to specific individuals other than
the plaintiff and to conciliation efforts are deleted.242
The EEOC has declared its willingness "to cooperate with private
Title VII litigants and to lend appropriate assistance in framing proper
court complaints .... "243 This assistance includes disclosing case file
information for use in "contemplated litigation. 2 44  Apparently, then,
the EEOC's files are available to potential, as well as actual, plaintiffs.
Section 709(e), however, prohibits the disclosure of such information
239. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
240. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1970).
241. H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 472 F.2d 1147, 1152 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 10 CCH Empl. Prac.
Dec. f 10,380 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
242. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Walsh, 12 CCH EMPL. PRAC. DEC.
11,116 (D.D.C. July 29, 1976); Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 10 CCH Empl. Prac.
Dec. 10,380 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
243. CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 83.7(c) (1) (1976).
244. Id. at § 83.3(a): "Information in case files may be disclosed provided that the
request is made for the purpose of reviewing information in the case file in connection
with pending or contemplated litigation." See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1611.1-.14 (1975).
Employer information not in a case file, such as the EEO-1 report, may also be disclosed.
CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 83.7(a) (1976).
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"prior to the institution of any proceeding" under Title VII. 245 Fur-
thermore, that section allows disclosure only when the new proceeding
involves such information, but the EEOC's stated policy is to permit
disclosure if the information concerns the same employer and would be
relevant or probative in the private litigant's case. 246 Under the
EEOC's broad definition of "relevant," a case file involving a charge of
discrimination against Hispanics might be available to a plaintiff whose
complaint alleged only discrimination against Blacks.247
Deference to the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII does not
require acceptance of a construction contrary to the plain language of
the act.248 The mere fact that information in EEOC files would be
useful to a private individual who is contemplating litigation does not
warrant its disclosure under Title VII. Ultimately, such disclosure will
also prove counterproductive because it compels respondents to adopt a
more defensive posture in dealing with commission investigators. Al-
though the EEOC requires that persons to whom case file information is
revealed agree not to make the information public,24 9 enforcement of
that promise is complicated by first amendment rights and by the
logistical problems associated with legal proceedings to enforce such a
promise.
The EEOC has established regulations governing disclosure of its
files pursuant to requests under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).250 That statute does not authorize the release of material
specifically exempted from disclosure 251 and provides criminal penalties
245. It is unclear from the statutory language whether "proceeding" means an
EEOC charge or only a lawsuit, although use of the word "institution" would imply a
legal proceeding. At least one court appears to have assumed that disclosure under
section 709(e) is permitted only after litigation has begun. Mosley v. General Motors
Corp., 10 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,380, at 5627 (ED. Mo. 1975). See also H.
Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 472 F.2d 1147, 1151 n.3 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 939 (1973). That interpretation is a logical one. A charging party acquires
no discovery rights merely by filing his charge, and the EEOC, as part of its investiga-
tion, can review other files without disclosing the information contained therein to the
new complainant. When the individual institutes his own suit, however, he bears the
responsibility for discovery. Moreover, at that point the respondent's interest in confi-
dentiality would not seem to require the protection necessary during EEOC conciliation
efforts.
246. That position has received judicial approval. See National Elec. Contractors
Ass'n v. Walsh, 12 CCH EMPL. PRAC. DEC. 11,116, at 5167 (D.D.C. July 29, 1976).
247. CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 83.7(c) (2).
248. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 45 U.S.L.W. 4031, 4036 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976);
Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1125-26 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
249. CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 83.3(b) (1976).
250. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970); see 29 C.F.R. §§ 1611.1-.14 (1975).
251. 5U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970).
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for obtaining records under false pretenses. 252 FOIA has been inter-
preted to accommodate the confidentiality provisions of Title VII, and
requests for information pertaining to the commission's conciliation
endeavors have been denied.2 53 However, confidentiality is only re-
quired prior to institution of a legal proceeding under the act. Accord-
dingly, one court has granted an application under FOIA for the
disclosure of compliance reports submitted to the government by certain
employers pursuant to a consent decree.254
A controversial facet of the confidentiality issue involves the ability
of federal agencies other than the EEOC to release information which
the EEOC itself could not release because of the proscriptions of Title
VII. A number of federal agencies, including the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance (OFCC) and the General Services Administration
(GSA), customarily share information and file materials with the
EEOC.255 The "EEO-I" forms submitted to various government
agencies are prepared by employers pursuant to EEOC regulations.25 6
When a federal contractor is charged with a violation of Title VII, the
commission customarily obtains a copy of the affirmative action report
which that contractor filed under OFCC regulations.257 Similar reports
are required of government contractors under GSA regulations. 58 De-
spite this agency interaction, it has been held that an employer's EEO-1
forms and affirmative action plans are not exempt from disclosure by
252. Id. at § 522a(i)(1) (Supp. V, 1975). The EEOC regulations incorporate such
penalties. 29 C.F.R. § 1611.12 (1970).
253. See, e.g., Parker v. EEOC, 534 F.2d 977, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (denying
request for copies of all predetermination settlement agreements and conciliation agree-
ments executed by EEOC Philadelphia office).
254. United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 11 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. % 10,791
(D.D.C. Apr. 5, 1976).
255. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between EEOC & OFCC, September
11, 1974, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDF 3780. This memorandum has received judicial
approval insofar as it allows the OFCC to transfer employer reports and data to the
EEOC. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 12 CCH EMPL. PRAc. DEC. 11,122 (E.D.
Va. July 27, 1976). The EEOC's published position is that it will not disclose
information obtained from the OFCC but will refer the party requesting such information
to that agency. CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 83.7(b) (1976).
256. EEOC regulations require each employer of more than one hundred persons to
file an information report (EEO-1) which includes a breakdown of all his employees by
race, sex and job classification. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (1975); 1 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE
1881 (1976).
257. The OFCC requires each employer with fifty or more employees and a
government contract of $50,000 or more to develop and implement affirmative action
programs aimed at increasing minority utilization. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.40, -2.1 to -2.32
(1976).
258. 41 C.F.R. § 1-12.800 to .814 (1976).
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agencies other than the EEOC merely because, under Title VII, the
EEOC itself could not have released them.259 In such cases, however,
other FOIA provisions offer protection to the employer. For example,
the statute does not compel disclosure of matters that are "trade secrets
and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential. '260  Thus, it has been held that those por-
tions of an employer's EEO-1 reports and affirmative action plans
containing labor data which might give competitors an unfair advantage
cannot be revealed by government agencies with which they have been
filed.26 1
The fact that information is in the hands of an agency other than
the EEOC should not be controlling on the question of disclosure,
because the congressional purpose in requiring confidentiality should
not be so easily defeated. While the Supreme Court has not yet spoken
on this issue, one Justice has had the opportunity to convey his individu-
al thoughts. In Chamber of Commerce v. Legal Aid Society,262 Justice
Douglas, sitting alone, denied a stay of a district court's discovery order
259. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 509 F.2d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1974). The data involved in
these cases was supplied to the agencies pursuant to regulations which do not prohibit
disclosure. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, supra at 528; Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
Schlesinger, supra at 294.
260. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970). It does not appear that an employer could
bring an action under FOIA to prevent the agency from disclosing data prior to the
agency's decision to disclose the information. When that decision is announced the
employer could seek judicial review of the agency's action under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970). See Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC,
12 BNA Fair Empl. Prac. Dec. 1729 (E.D. Va. 1976). If the EEOC has threatened to
release data to be provided to it pursuant to a subpoena issued under Title VII, an
employer might be able to challenge the subpoena on the ground that the threatened
disclosure would violate Title VII. Id. The EEOC rarely informs a respondent of its
intention to disclose file material. An argument could be made that this policy is
unconstitutional as a violation of due process because the respondent is denied a property
right without a hearing. See Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171, 178-79
(D. Del. 1976).
261. Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171, 176 (D. Del. 1976); Westing-
house Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1249 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 12
CCH EMPL. PRAc. DEC. 1 11,208 (4th Cir. 1976). See also Sea-Land Services, Inc. v.
Morton, 11 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 11 10,792, at 7333 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 1976). In Sea-
Land the court ordered the deletion of individual names and salaries, of reasons for
termination, and of specific employment test titles while permitting disclosure of an em-
ployer's affirmative action plan. Id. The existence of commercial disadvantage is a
question of fact. Disclosure will not be barred if the employer fails to establish such
disadvantage. See United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 11 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec.
10,791 (D.D.C. Apr. 5, 1976); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292,
296-98 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
262. 423 U.S. 1309 (1975).
requiring the GSA to disclose certain EEO-1, affirmative action, and
compliance reports in its possession. Although the stay was denied for
lack of provable irreparable injury, Justice Douglas expressed substan-
tial concern regarding the merits of the case, because the EEOC was
authorized to obtain the information in question and would have been
prohibited from disclosing it by Title VII. He wrote:
To be sure, the information in the AAP's and the EEO-I's in this
case was not obtained directly by the EEOC. Rather, the infor-
mation was apparently collected by a Joint Reporting Committee
of both the EEOC and the federal compliance agency (in this case,
GSA) under Executive Order No. 11246. But the information
in the EEO-l's was obtained, in part, on behalf of the EEOC,
see 41 CFR §60-1.7(a)(1), and much of the information con-
tained in the AAP's is essentially in the nature of that protected by
§709. Indeed, certain policy considerations underlying the regula-
tions precluding release by the GSA of information contained in
the AAP's are akin to those motivating the confidentiality imple-
mented by §709. In view of the foregoing, though some of the
information involved here neither was obtained, nor is to be dis-
closed, by the EEOC, the congressional purpose of confidentiality,
protected by criminal sanctions, is not to be lightly circumvented. 263
Conclusion
It has been said that the EEOC's proceedings are "purely non-
adversary"26 and, in the sense that the agency can only investigate and
conciliate but cannot adjudicate, that statement is technically accurate.
As a practical matter, however, the EEOC lost its right to claim neutrali-
ty when the 1972 amendments to Title VII were enacted. The EEOC
still cannot adjudicate, but it can litigate, and the employer who fails to
appreciate that fact during the investigative process will regret it in
court. Moreover, even when the commission decides not to institute its
own suit, 26 5 it may lend assistance to other potential plaintiffs, including
providing access to relevant case files.266 Such plaintiffs might include
civil rights groups and other class representatives who received, in the
1972 amendments to the act, the right to file charges on behalf of
persons claiming to be aggrieved.267
263. Id. at 1311-12.
264. EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 370 (4th Cir. 1976).
265. The commission has sufficient resources to institute actions in only about 10%
of the cases in which conciliation efforts are unsuccessful. See BNA EEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL, SUMMARY OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS No. 7 (Aug. 6, 1976).
266. See notes 242-46 & accompanying text supra.
267. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V, 1975). See, e.g., Wisconsin Nat'l Org. for
Women v. Wisconsin, 12 CCH EMPL. PRAc. DEC. 11,140 (W.D. Wis. July 30, 1976);
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Under Title VII, the employer is exposed to substantial liability at
the hands of one or more of these potential plaintiffs, and the founda-
tion for such exposure is laid during the EEOC investigation of the
charge of discrimination. The contents of the investigative file may well
determine the decision of the commission and other possible plaintiffs on
whether to file suit against a particular employer. The employer who
wishes to minimize the likelihood that his company will be selected for
litigation must seek to (a) limit the scope of the commission's investiga-
tion, (b) assert his procedural rights, and (c) recognize circumstances
warranting an early effort at settlement. The employer must also be
prepared to take the initiative when necessary to complete the investiga-
tive file. Convincing an inexperienced paraprofessional investigator
that the charge of discrimination is groundless will not be useful, and
may be counterproductive, if the investigator's more experienced super-
visor remands the case for further processing. The employer will thus
often benefit from submitting data not requested by the investigator but
probative of the employer's position. For example, figures showing
minority hiring for the previous two years may establish a better overall
picture than similar data for the preceding twelve months, and the
employer would be well advised to submit the former statistics even
though the investigator requested only the latter. Similarly, the employ-
er from whom hiring statistics have been requested may benefit from
providing a list of minority promotions as well. In addition, a docu-
ment indicating the minority percentages of all plants in the state may be
preferable to one showing only the plant in which the charging party
was employed.
Assuming the initiative in this manner requires the employer to
perform his own investigation of a charge prior to that conducted by the
EEOC. The time consumed by such an effort is justified by the
exposure to liability. Given the fact that the EEOC typically notifies
the employer of the charge months before the investigation begins, the
employer should have ample opportunity to complete his own review of
the facts. This review may convince the employer that the charging
party was in fact treated unfairly and he may wish to seek a predetermi-
nation settlement with the commission. Although the EEOC's pub-
lished position is that such a settlement cannot be entered into prior to a
preliminary investigation,208 the willingness of the employer to reach
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873 (C.D. Cal.
1976).
268. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19a (1975); CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 61.3
(1976). The respondent also has the right, recognized by the commission, to deal
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such an agreement, expressed prior to the start of the investigation, will
in most cases have a substantial limiting effect on the scope of the
EEOC effort.
The employer may also prepare for confrontations with the EEOC
long before a charge is filed by maintaining records and statistics on
utilization of minorities in his work force. Such records are not re-
quired but are recommended by the EEOC.269 Their availability in the
event of a discrimination charge could hasten considerably a favorable
completion of the investigation. The defensive employer should main-
tain the following records, in addition to personnel records on incum-
bent employees: (1) job descriptions stating the duties and hiring
standards for each position; (2) applicant flow data, including the
visible group characteristics of each applicant, whether or not he com-
pletes an application form;2"' (3) interview reports, indicating the
interviewer's reasons for rejection or acceptance of all applicants; (4)
the results of any employment tests administered to job applicants;2 '
(5) written explanations of decisions to promote, transfer, layoff, recall,
discipline, or discharge; and (6) payroll statistics showing the date of
personally with the charging party in an attempt to settle the charge. EEOC Dec. No.
70-547, CCH EEOC Dec. 6123 (1973).
269. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.12, .13 (1975). Personnel records must be maintained for
six months after they are made, and for six months after an employee is involuntarily
terminated. If a discrimination charge is filed, the records must be preserved until final
disposition of the charge. Id. § 1602.14 (1975).
270. In one case, an employer successfully defended an action alleging discrimina-
tion against Mexican-Americans by introducing into evidence applicant flow statistics
showing that the percentage of job applicants hired was greater with respect to Mexican-
Americans than to any other racial or ethnic group. Ochoa v. Monsanto Co., 335 F.
Supp. 53, 56, 59 (S.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 473 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1973); see Schneider,
The Unprotected Minority: Employers and Civil Rights Compliance, 49 L.A.B. BuLL..
458, 487 (1974). See also Buckner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 339 F. Supp. 1108,
1115-16 (N.D. Ala. 1972). But see Jones v. Tri-County Elec. Coop., 512 F.2d 1, 2-3
(5th Cir. 1975).
271. The EEOC's broad definition of "test" includes "all formal, scored, quantified
or standard techniques of assessing job suitability including . . . specific qualifying or
disqualifying personal history or background requirements, specific educational or work
history requirements, scored interviews, biographical information blanks, interviewers"
rating scales, scored application forms, etc." 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2 (1975). See generally
Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975) (evaluation of applicant's
criminal record); Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974) (consideration
of garnishments); Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), af'd,
472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972) (arrest record). All tests which have an adverse impact on
the hiring of a minority or ethnic group must be validated to establish a correlation with
successful job performance. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.3-.8 (1975); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 US. 424, 436
(1971).
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hire and the salary of all employees. If possible, these records should be
a determination maintained for two or three years because EEOC in-
vestigations often take that long to complete. 272
In sum, the best way to avoid litigation under Title VII is to obtain
a determination of "no reasonable cause" from the EEOC.2 7 3  To en-
hance that possibility, the employer must be prepared at an early stage
in the investigation to provide the EEOC representative with the evidence
he needs to recommend a decision favorable to the employer. The
employer simply cannot afford to be a passive conduit of data requested
by the commission when his employment practices are challenged. Cir-
cumstances require that he assume a more active role. It is far less
expensive to justify one's employment practices to an EEOC representa-
tive investigating a single charge of discrimination than it is to defend
those same practices before a United States district judge in a class
action.
272. 9 EEOC ANN. REP. 2 (1974).
273. A finding of reasonable cause is a prerequisite to suit by the EEOC. EEOC v.
Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985, 991-92 (D. Md. 1974). It is not a prerequisite to a
private action. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973).
However, a negative finding will tend to discourage such a suit. Obtaining a "no cause"
finding is not an easy task. In the EEOC's 1974 fiscal year, only 36% of the
determinations were "no cause". 9 EEOC ANN. REP. 47 (1974).

